Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to resolve conflicting interpretations of Exemption 4 of the Freedom of Information Act (“FOIA”). Food Marketing Institute contends that the plain meaning interpretation of Exemption 4 applies the exemption to confidential information, regardless of the competitive harm that will be caused if disclosed. And, if the Court selectively applies Exemption 4 to confidential information that will cause substantive competitive harm if disclosed, Food Marking Institute argues, then a reasonable possibility of competitive harm should satisfy the substantive harm standard. In response, Argus Leader Media asserts that Food Marketing Institute lacks the standing to bring this argument, because the Supreme Court cannot prohibit the disclosure of this information, precluding redressability. Argus Leader Media additionally asserts that the statutory context of Exemption 4—including multiple uses of identical language in other statutes—suggests that the Exemption 4 only applies to information that causes competitive harm. The outcome of this case will have implications on the disclosure of Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program (“SNAP”) data and other privately-held data, consumer interests, and public health and safety.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Issues

In this case, the Supreme Court will determine whether parts of the Michigan third-degree home invasion statute fall under the Armed Career Criminal Act’s (“ACCA”) definition of “burglary.” Specifically, the Court will determine at what point in time a defendant who unlawfully enters a building must form the intent to commit another crime. Petitioner Jamar Alonzo Quarles argues that a defendant must form the intent to commit another crime at the initial moment of unlawful entry or unlawful remaining in a structure, in order for his or her conduct to qualify as burglary. Respondent United States contends that it is sufficient that a defendant develops the intent to commit another crime at any point while unlawfully remaining in the structure. This case will impact the number of criminal defendants subjected to enhanced sentencing under the ACCA.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the Fourth Amendment permits police to draw blood from unconscious drivers under a theory of implied consent in lieu of a warrant. Gerard Mitchell, a driver from whom police drew blood while he was unconscious, contends that the Fourth Amendment’s consent exception should not apply because a blood draw is a serious intrusion that calls for a warrant. Wisconsin argues that it has a great interest in addressing intoxicated driving, and it fairly uses an implied-consent statute that allows it to draw blood from unconscious drivers. Mitchell suggests that permitting these warrantless blood draws may seriously threaten privacy rights and open the door to additional forms of warrantless intrusions. Wisconsin warns of the dangers posed by impeding police efforts to remove intoxicated drivers from the road.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether the government must prove that a defendant knew that they were prohibited from purchasing a firearm as a result of their residency status in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 922(g), which prohibits a person who is unlawfully in the United States from possessing any firearm or ammunition and its penalty statute, 18 U.S.C. § 924(a)(2). Hamid Rehaif was charged with violating these provisions when he purchased a firearm after, unbeknownst to him, his visa had expired. Rehaif contends that the government must prove that he knew about his unlawful status when he had purchased the fire arm. The United States government counters that they need not prove Rehaif knew he was unlawfully in the United States. The outcome of this case will impact the degree of protection defendants have against unknowingly unlawful conduct, the nature of evidence that the prosecution must present at federal criminal trials, and the legal consequences of making an unauthorized purchase of a firearm.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine what role, if any, good-faith belief plays in relation to contempt and bankruptcy discharge orders. Petitioner Bradley Weston Taggart contends that the bankruptcy code does not afford protection for creditors who violate a discharge order, even when a creditor holds a good-faith belief that his or her attempt at collection is permissible under the law. Respondents Shelley A. Lorenzen and others counter that the bankruptcy code must consider a creditor’s good-faith belief, because otherwise creditors would be held in contempt for minor violations that make it harder for them to seek collection of non-dischargeable debt. The outcome of this case will have significant implications on the limits of creditor liability and debtor protection in the discharge context as well as implications for legal advocacy, state taxation, and the economy.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the statute of limitations on a fabrication‑of‑evidence claim begins upon termination of criminal proceedings or when the defendant first becomes aware of the fraudulent evidence. Edward McDonough was accused of forging and falsifying campaign documents during local elections in 2009, and he was acquitted in December 2012. Then, he sued Youel Smith, the prosecutor in McDonough’s case, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that he forged documents and falsified evidence in order to convict McDonough. In response, Smith moved to dismiss the suit, arguing that it was untimely and barred by laches. McDonough argues that fabrication‑of‑evidence claims should be analogized to malicious prosecution claims, where the limitations period begins once proceedings terminate in a defendant’s favor. On the other hand, Smith contends that such a suit could be brought earlier because it does not require showing a lack of probable cause. The outcome of this case will determine when a criminal defendant is expected to bring a fabrication­‑of‑evidence claim concerning associated criminal proceedings.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine the meaning of the residual clause of 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(3)(B), which defines Hobbs Act robbery, and whether the statute is constitutional. In 2015, Davis and Glover were convicted of several robberies under the Hobbs Act robbery statute. The two appealed their convictions to the Supreme Court after the Court in Sessions v. Dimaya held that the similarly worded “crime of violence” definition in the Immigration and Nationality Act was unconstitutional because the text was too vague. The United States government argues that the “crime of violence” language is constitutionally valid because the most appropriate reading of the statute implies analyzing an individual’s case and particularized facts, and not a “categorical approach” which looks at the ordinary expectations of the crime. The government further asserts that constitutional avoidance implies a categorical approach in conformity with congressional intent and the Constitution. Davis and Glover counter that the correct reading of Section 924(c)(3)(B) is a categorical approach as suggested by the text and placement within the statute. They further maintain that upholding the subsection under the doctrine of constitutional avoidance would upset the rule of lenity. The outcome of this case will determine the scope of the judiciary’s power to construe statute construction based on constitutionality and the occurrence of possible conviction reconsiderations for currently incarcerated individuals.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to define the private right of action under Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Gary Varjabedian and other Emulex Corporation shareholders contend that they have a right to file a private action against Emulex under Section 14(e). Emulex Corporation and Avago Technologies Wireless Manufacturing, Inc. counter that Section 14(e) does not allow a private cause of action based on negligence, and that a higher scienter standard should apply instead. The Supreme Court’s ruling will have significant implications for shareholders’ interests in the event of a merger.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Issues

Erik Brunetti founded a clothing brand named “FUCT” and applied to register the name as a trademark. The registration was denied by the examining attorney at the United States Patent and Trademark Office for not complying with Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, which prohibits registration of scandalous or immoral marks. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concluded that the provision was an unconstitutional violation of the First Amendment of the Constitution. Brunetti asks the Court to affirm the lower court’s invalidation of the provision because it amounts to viewpoint discrimination warranting strict scrutiny review, which the provision then fails. Iancu asks the Court to reverse the lower court decision because the scandalous marks provision is viewpoint neutral and does not impose an unconstitutional burden on speech. Iancu argues that the Court should instead apply the rational basis review standard and recognize that the provision serves legitimate government interests in protecting the moral sensibilities of all audiences as well as the orderly flow of commerce. The Court’s decision may have a chilling effect on free speech in commercial contexts and make it difficult for owners of marks deemed scandalous or immoral to reap commercial benefits from their marks.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources

Issues

In this case, the Supreme Court will determine whether a state in which a trust’s beneficiaries reside has the power to tax that trust’s income. Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a state has the authority to tax an individual or entity—such as a trust—if that entity has “minimum contacts” with the state. North Carolina Department of Revenue argues that a beneficiary’s residence in a state provides sufficient minimum contacts between a trust and a state to authorize the state to tax the trust’s income. Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust, on the other hand, contends that a state does not have the authority to tax a trust’s income based solely on the fact that beneficiaries reside in that state. The outcome of this case will determine the limits on state power to tax trusts and will have implications for all those involved in trust creation, management, and benefits.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Written by

Edited by

Additional Resources