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In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether 35 U.S.C. § 314(d) precludes judicial review of the Patent Trial and Appeal Board’s (“the Board”) decision to grant an inter partes review after determining that an effective statute of limitations under Section 315(b) does not apply. Thryv, Inc., contends that the plain language of Sections 314(d) and 315(b) and relevant Supreme Court precedent renders such decisions nonappealable. Click-To-Call Technologies counters that the plain language of Section 314(d) contains nothing to indicate that judicial review of the Board’s interpretation of Section 315(b) is prohibited, and that Supreme Court precedent has confirmed this understanding. The outcome of this case will have important implications on the scope of administrative power, incentives for product innovation, and the integrity of the patent system.

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This case arises out of a custody dispute between an Italian father, Domenico Taglieri, and an American mother, Michelle Monasky, whose marriage had deteriorated, and where the mother had removed the child to the United States before a court could determine the parents’ custody rights. To determine whether the child must be returned to Italy, the Supreme Court must decide whether to uphold the Sixth Circuit’s order to return the child based on its affirmation of the district court’s determination that the child habitually resided in Italy. Monasky argues that the Hague Convention’s text supports an actual-agreement standard for habitual residence, and that the Hague Convention does not contemplate courts imposing habitual residence on a child when the child’s situation in the state would be precarious and the child lacks meaningful connections with the state. She further argues that the statute, appellate history, and the mixed legal and factual nature of habitual residence support de novo review. Taglieri responds that the lower courts properly applied a fact-sensitive analysis of the child’s situation in Italy and, furthermore, that if “actual agreement” were required, the Hague Convention would under-protect children in hotly disputed custody cases who most need protection. He also contends that clear-error review should apply because habitual residence issues are more factual than legal, and because such review is more expedient, consistent with the Hague Convention’s aims. The outcome of this case will have implications for international child abduction and custody cases involving claims of domestic violence.

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In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether the Supreme Court of Arizona correctly weighed mitigating and aggravating factors when conducting an independent review of James Erin McKinney’s capital sentence, and whether the correction of the original sentencing error required resentencing by a jury at the trial level. McKinney argues that, by conducting a sentencing review, the state court reopened his finalized case, thus allowing the application of modern constitutional protections in his sentencing, which require resentencing by a jury. Arizona counters that the independent review conducted by the state court did not constitute direct review that reopened McKinney’s case and that McKinney’s sentence does not require review at the trial level. The outcome of this case will impact the retroactive application of newly established constitutional rights in capital sentencing and could afford a new opportunity for capital defendants for whom a judge conducted sentencing to be resentenced by a jury.

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This case consolidates four lawsuits, together asking the Court to determine if Section 1342 of the Affordable Care Act statutorily obliges Congress to fulfill outstanding payments to insurance companies after Congress failed to appropriate funds for these payments. Section 1342 established a “risk-corridors program,” whereby health insurers and the United States government would share unforeseen costs associated with providing universal healthcare on “health benefit exchanges.” Petitioners argue that Section 1342 statutorily requires the government to make full “payments out” to insurance companies who have suffered a loss—regardless of whether Congress appropriated enough money to cover these losses. Respondent, the United States, counters that Section 1342 merely created a program to oversee “payments out” to health insurers, and even if it does oblige the government to make payments, Congress’s appropriations riders repealed that obligation. The outcome of this case has implications for the separation of powers principles and the future of public-private partnerships.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether a formal objection at sentencing is necessary for criminal defendants to receive reasonableness review of the length of their sentence upon appeal. Gonzalo Holguin-Hernandez argues that Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 51 (“Rule 51”) only requires defense counsel to argue prior to sentencing that a certain sentence would be unreasonable, thereby rendering a formal post-sentencing objection unnecessary. The United States agrees and also argues against the Fifth Circuit’s requirement of a formal post-sentence objection. The Court appointed an Amicus to brief the opposing side of the issue. Amicus argues that both Petitioner and Respondent misinterpret Rule 51, and that defendants must clearly state their objection and its grounds to preserve an argument for reasonableness review on appeal. The outcome of this case has implications for how clearly defendants need to articulate their objections to a court’s sentence and for the consistency of court procedure across criminal and civil cases.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the issue of a petitioner’s request for equitable tolling in filing motions to reopen his deportation proceedings is a purely legal question or a mixed question of law and fact. Petitioners Pedro Pablo Guerrero-Lasprilla and Ruben Ovalles contend that the term “question of law” in 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(D) encompasses mixed questions of law and fact, thereby permitting appellate courts to review whether immigration judges or the Board of Immigration Appeals correctly applied the law to settled historical facts. They contend that even if the Court finds that “question of law” does not encompass mixed questions of law and fact, Guerrero and Ovalles assert that the issue of equitable tolling is closer to a legal rather than factual inquiry, therefore also allowing the appellate courts to review the decision. Attorney General William P. Barr counters that “question of law” does not extend to mixed questions of law and fact, and that even if it did, equitable tolling is a primarily factual determination that cannot be subject to judicial review. This case will affect whether courts experience an increase in the amount of litigation and expended resources, and the effectiveness and meaningfulness of judicial review of immigration proceedings.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether and under what circumstances a timely Rule 59(e) motion should be recharacterized as a second or successive habeas petition under Gonzalez v. Crosby. Under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act (“AEDPA”), a petitioner may not obtain habeas relief for a state court’s decision on a claim unless the decision clearly runs counter to the Constitution or is based on an unreasonable determination of the facts. Section 2244(b) of AEDPA requires a court to dismiss a claim, if it presents a second or successive habeas corpus application that was presented in a prior application. Banister argues that a Rule 59(e) motion, which mandates that a motion to alter or amend a judgment be filed within 28 days of the judgment, does not constitute a “second or successive habeas application” under Section 2244(b) because it is part of a habeas applicant’s first habeas proceeding. Although Gonzalez held that a Rule 60(b) motion, which asks a court to relieve the movant from a final judgment, can constitute a second or successive habeas application, Banister contends that a Rule 59(e) motion does not similarly apply to Section 2244(b)’s restrictions because it is distinct from a Rule 60(b) motion. In response, Davis argues that so long as a Rule 59(e) motion is made after a final adjudicated judgment, it constitutes a second or successive habeas application subject to Section 2244(b)’s restrictions. Davis further asserts that Rule 59(e) and Rule 60(b) motions are similar enough to warrant the same treatment under Section 2244(b)’s restrictions. The outcome of this case will affect the timing for filing Rule 59(e) motions. This case will also have important implications for the limitations placed on federal habeas corpus review and on courts’ ability to correct or clarify previous rulings.

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This case asks the U.S. Supreme Court to decide whether New York City’s (the “City”) restrictions on the transportation of handguns is unconstitutional pursuant to the Second Amendment, the Commerce Clause, or the fundamental right to travel. Under a former rule, the City issued premises licenses to qualified individuals. Such licenses permitted a licensee to possess a handgun at the licensee’s City residence but placed restrictions upon the transportation of the handgun to locations outside of the City. Romolo Colantone, Efrain Alvarez, and Tony Irizarry (collectively, “Petitioners”) were issued premises licenses and wanted to use their handguns at shooting ranges and competitions located outside of the City, and Colantone wanted to transport his handgun to and from his second home in upstate New York. Petitioners, joined by the New York State Rifle and Pistol Association, argue that the City’s transportation restrictions violate the Second Amendment, the Commerce Clause, and the fundamental right to travel. The City, joined by the New York City Police Department-License Division, counters that its former rule is a constitutional exercise of its regulatory power and protects public safety. The City recently amended the rule at issue, so the City also argues that this case is moot. In addition to impacting City residents who possess handguns under a premises license, the Court’s decision will have implications for public safety concerns of vulnerable populations and populations living within major urban areas and is likely to inform national debate on gun control.

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The Supreme Court will decide when Section 1113(2) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act’s statute of limitations begins to run. Both parties agree that the text of Section 1113(2) establishes that the three-year statute of limitations runs from the date on which the plaintiff had actual knowledge of a violation, but dispute what actual knowledge means. Petitioner Intel Corp. Investment Policy Committee argues that actual knowledge means being in possession of proof of the violation, whether a plaintiff is aware of the violation or not. Respondent Christopher M. Sulyma argues that actual knowledge means when the plaintiff is fully aware and understands that a violation took place. The Court’s decision will affect both employers’ incentives to offer retirement plans and also employees who struggle to  comprehend the complex and lengthy plan documents provided to them by their employers.

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The Supreme Court will determine whether the government edicts doctrine renders uncopyrightable the annotations in the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (“OCGA.”) The government edicts doctrine prevents individuals from copyrighting government edicts—such as judicial decisions and statutes. The State of Georgia and the Georgia Code Revision Committee (“Georgia”) argue that the annotations—which were primarily written by private actors and do not carry the force of law—are beyond the scope of the government edicts doctrine. PublicResource.Org disagrees, arguing that because (1) the annotations are published under a state authority, and (2) Georgia’s Supreme Court treats the OCGA annotations as authentic sources of legal meaning, the annotations carry the force of law and are thus uncopyrightable under the government edicts doctrine. The Court’s decision will have implications for organizations’ abilities to provide low-cost or free public access to state laws and non-legal codes and standards (e.g. construction codes and standards).

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