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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether, under the Copyright Act of 1976, software interfaces can receive copyright protections that convey exclusive rights to the software author and, if so, under what conditions a secondary use of that software constitutes fair use. Google argues that no copyright protections should extend to Oracle’s Java SE declaring code under copyright law’s merger doctrine. Even if copyright protection is warranted, Google contends that its use of the Java SE declaring code to create its Android platform constitutes fair use due to the transformative nature of and limited copying in the Android platform. Oracle counters that software interfaces deserve the same copyright protections as other works because of the expressive nature of the software. As such, Oracle asserts that Google’s use of Java SE is not fair use because it harmed Oracle’s market for licensing Java SE. The outcome of this case has heavy implications for the use of programming languages in future technology as well as the open-book industry standard for borrowing computer code to further technological advances.

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This case asks the Court to decide whether presidential electors can exercise discretion when  casting their electoral votes for the President and Vice President, even if such votes are inconsistent with the appointing state’s popular vote and violate that state’s law binding electors to the state’s popular vote. For the 2016 general election, the Colorado Democratic Party appointed Michael Baca as one of its nine presidential electors. And when Hillary Clinton won the popular vote in Colorado, state law required Michael Baca to cast his electoral vote for her. Michael Baca, however, voted for John Kasich. Petitioner, the Colorado Department of State (“Colorado”), subsequently removed Michael Baca from office and cancelled his electoral vote. Colorado first argues that Michael Baca lacks standing to sue because he was not personally injured by his removal from office. And second, that Article II of the Constitution and the Twelfth Amendment empowers states to control their electors. Respondents, Michael Baca and two other electors (the “Electors”), counter that they do have standing to sue because their removal from office and cancellation of their vote constitute a concrete, personal injury. Further, the Electors assert that under the text and history of Article II and the Twelfth Amendment, they have discretion when casting their electoral vote. The outcome of this case has implications for the future of the electoral system, the meaning of the popular vote, and the likelihood of fraud and corruption.

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This case asks whether a state may sanction a presidential elector who does not vote according to the state’s legislatively mandated procedures for how presidential electors must vote. The Electoral College is comprised of each state’s electors based on its number of U.S. senators and representatives. Under Article II of the Constitution, each state selects the presidential electors who will cast the state’s allotted votes for the President and Vice President. In Washington State, each political party selects a group of electors who will represent the State if their candidate receives the most votes on Election Day in November. Washington law requires that each of its appointed electors pledge that they will vote for the candidate nominated by their party. Anyone who does not fulfill this pledge and becomes a “faithless elector” is subject to a civil penalty of up to $1,000. Petitioners Chiafalo, Guerra, and John were fined after violating their pledge. They argue that Washington’s law sanctioning faithless electors is unconstitutional because the Constitution forbids the states from controlling or imposing any conditions on its state’s presidential electors. Respondent Washington State counters that the Constitution does not impose any conditions on the methods that states use to select their electors and therefore, states can choose whether or not to impose any restrictions on their presidential electors. The outcome of this case has implications on the 2020 presidential election, the institutional legitimacy of the Electoral College, and state involvement with presidential electors.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the State of Oklahoma has, for decades, been improperly exercising criminal jurisdiction over land within the historical boundaries of the Muscogee (Creek) Native American tribe in Eastern Oklahoma. The Oklahoma Court of Criminal Appeals held that Oklahoma had jurisdiction to prosecute a Native American defendant, Jimcy McGirt, for crimes that he committed within Oklahoma’s borders but entirely on the Muscogee (Creek) Nation’s historically tribal lands. McGirt, as the Petitioner, argues that because his crime took place on the Muscogee (Creek) reservation and he is an enrolled Seminole-tribe member, only the federal government has jurisdiction to prosecute him in this case. Oklahoma, as the Respondent, counters that the land on which McGirt committed his crimes was never an Indian reservation—instead, Congress classified the land as a dependent Indian community until Congress removed this classification and gave Oklahoma criminal jurisdiction over the community’s land. From a policy perspective, this case is important because it will likely determine whether a substantial portion of Oklahoma is exclusively controlled by the Muscogee (Creek) Nation and the federal government, which in turn would have enormous legal, economic, and social implications

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether two teachers at two Catholic schools are “ministers” and thus fall within the First Amendment’s “ministerial exception.” This exception immunizes religious employers from generally applicable employment-discrimination laws, so long as the employees at issue are considered “ministers.” Petitioners, Our Lady of Guadalupe School and St. James Catholic School (“the Schools”), contend that that under Hosanna-Tabor, an employee’s “job function” is the primary factor that courts should consider when determining whether an employee of a religious organization qualifies as a “minister.” The Schools contend that both teachers at issue here engaged in important religious functions by teaching religion to students. Respondents and teachers, Agnes Morrissey-Berru and Kristen Biel (“Morrissey-Berru”), counter that Hosanna-Tabor established a four-factor test, looking not only to the employee’s religious functions, but also to her title, training, and actions. According to Morrissey-Berru, neither teacher held a ministerial title, received religious training, nor held themselves out to be ministers. Even looking to their religious functions, she contends that teaching religion among other secular subjects is insufficient to make a teacher a minister. The outcome of this case will have implications for religious organizations’ employment practices and the civil-rights protections of their employees.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether a grand-jury subpoena served on the president’s accounting firm that demands 10 years’ worth of the president’s financial records comports with the Constitution. President Trump argues that Article II renders the president categorically immune to any criminal process while in office. This is especially so here, President Trump argues, where the Supremacy Clause asserts the primacy of federal interests over those of state courts, and where the criminal nature of the subpoena imposes a stigma. Vance counters that Article II and the Supremacy Clause do not apply where the particular legal process does not implicate or impinge on the president’s official conduct. Vance points to the Court’s centuries-long practice of enforcing presidential subpoenas. The outcome of this case will significantly affect local officials’ ability to launch investigations into matters concerning sitting presidents, as well as presidents’ immunity from grand jury investigations while in office.

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The Supreme Court will determine whether a congressional committee may subpoena a third-party for the financial records of the President of the United States. The United States Courts of Appeals for the District of Columbia and the Second Circuit have both held that congressional committees did not exceed their constitutional authority when they issued subpoenas to President Donald Trump’s accountant and several banks for his personal financial records, because those subpoenas were related to legitimate legislative purposes. Petitioner President Trump argues that Congress may not issue subpoenas for the documents of a sitting President under the constitutional doctrine of separation of powers. Respondents, three Committees of the House of Representatives, argue that Congress has long exercised investigative power over the President as part of its legislative function. This case will likely affect the number and scope of future congressional subpoenas for a President’s personal records.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the government violates the First Amendment when it requires the foreign affiliates of U.S.-based nongovernmental organizations to adopt policies explicitly opposing prostitution and sex trafficking in order to receive federal funding. The United States Leadership Against HIV/AIDS, Tuberculosis, and Malaria Act of 2003 (the “Leadership Act”) authorizes federal funding for nongovernmental organizations to assist their worldwide campaigns against HIV/AIDS and other diseases. But the Act requires fund recipients to adopt a policy that explicitly opposes prostitution and sex trafficking (the “Policy Requirement”). The United States Agency for International Development (“USAID”) administers the Leadership Act and contends that requiring foreign affiliates to comply with the Policy Requirement does not violate the First Amendment rights of these domestic organizations. It explains that First Amendment rights do not extend to the foreign affiliates because foreign entities are not entitled to any First Amendment rights and are legally distinct from their domestic counterparts. The Alliance for Open Society International, Inc. (“AOSI”) counters that the Policy Requirement infringes on its First Amendment rights because it compels speech that is likely to be attributed to AOSI. The outcome of this case has heavy implications for the international network of welfare workers, as well as the government’s control on federal funding.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the addition of a domain suffix such as “.com” to a generic term like “booking” can create a protectable trademark. The Petitioners, United States Patent and Trademark Office and the Department of Justice, contend that the Court’s decision in Goodyear that the addition of a corporate designation such as “Company” or “Inc.” to a generic word does not render the combination protectable, extends to adding a “.com” suffix. The Respondent, Booking.com, counters that the Lanham Act repudiated Goodyear, and advocates for the application of the “primary significance” test which focuses the genericness inquiry on whether the consuming public views the term as signifying the producer rather than the product. The Court’s decision will have implications for online companies that have invested resources in developing their brand recognition using generic terms. 

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether the TCPA’s unsolicited-cellphone-call ban and its government-debt exception are valid under the First Amendment. Attorney General William P. Barr and the Federal Communications Commission (FCC) (collectively, “the Government”) argue that the government-debt exception is content-neutral because the exception distinguishes permitted and prohibited conduct solely based on economic activity. They also contend that the exception satisfies intermediate scrutiny because the exception strikes the appropriate balance between Congress’s legitimate interests in protecting consumer privacy and preserving public funds. The Government argues that the exception, if invalid, is severable from the cellphone-call ban because the ban stood for twenty-four years before the exception was enacted, and because this history suggests that Congress would prefer to leave the ban in place. The American Association of Political Correspondents, Inc., et al. (collectively, “AAPC”) respond that the ban and the exception are content-based because they restrict permitted call topics and that neither the ban nor the exception survive either strict or intermediate scrutiny because there is no privacy interest to which the cellphone-call ban and the government-debt exception are closely tailored. AAPC refutes that severability is the appropriate remedy because the whole ban is an unconstitutional restriction on speech. The Court’s decision raises concerns about the potential impact on the government’s efforts in protecting consumer privacy and in helping borrowers avoid default on debts owed to or guaranteed by the federal government. The Court’s decision raises concerns about consumers’ privacy interests, the government’s ability to collect debt, and increasing litigation costs.

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