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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether a “violent felony” under the Armed Career Criminal Act of 1984 includes crimes in which an individual used force recklessly. Petitioner Charles Borden asserts that the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit incorrectly held that committing a crime with a mens rea of recklessness constitutes a violent felony because the mental state of recklessness does not include the intention or knowledge that would satisfy the requirement of using force “against the person of another.” Respondent United States counters that a mens rea of recklessness satisfies the element because the focus is on the “use” of the physical force, which does not discern between mental states. The outcome of this case has important implications for criminal procedure, due process rights, and the necessary interpretation of the text of the ACCA.

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This case asks the Court to balance First Amendment rights with the government’s interest in promoting equality. Petitioner Catholic Social Services (“CSS”) contracted with Respondent City of Philadelphia (“the City”) to provide foster care and choose foster parents for the City’s youth; however, CSS objected to the inclusion of a non-discrimination clause in its contract that required it to consider LGBT+ individuals as foster parents. CSS argues that the City’s non-discrimination clause specifically targets it as a Catholic organization, thereby infringing upon its religious beliefs under the Free Exercise Clause and compelling it to endorse LGBT+ relationships in contravention of the Free Speech Clause. The City counters that the non-discrimination clause is a policy that applies to all contractors who undertake governmental work, and that CSS cannot claim to use religious freedom to undermine the City’s strong interest in preventing discrimination. The Supreme Court’s decision in this case will implicate laws impacting religious freedom, LGBT+ issues, and equal protection.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the deliberative process privilege under Exemption 5 of the Freedom of Information Act protects interagency draft documents. The documents in question are draft biological jeopardy opinions produced by the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service pursuant to Section 7 of the Endangered Species Act during an environmental consultation with the Environmental Protection Agency regarding a proposed agency regulation. The Sierra Club contends that the requested documents do not fall within the scope of the deliberative process privilege exemption because the jeopardy decision within the draft opinion was final, not tentative, and the documents shaped later agency decisions by requiring the Environmental Protection Agency to discontinue, modify, or seek an exemption for its proposed action. The U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service and the National Marine Fisheries Service argue that the requested documents fall within the scope of the deliberative process privilege exemption because the exemption aims to encourage effective governmental decision-making and must protect inter-agency documents and memoranda that have not been adopted as final to further this goal. By granting certiorari in this case, the Supreme Court will determine the extent to which government agencies can invoke the deliberative process privilege and the correlative scope of the public’s right of access to information under the Freedom of Information Act.

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This case asks the Court to decide whether a state may impose a sentence of life without parole on a juvenile who is found guilty of murder without first finding that the juvenile is permanently incorrigible. Petitioner Brett Jones contends that the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence on cruel and unusual punishment categorically prohibits a life sentence without parole for a juvenile offender who is not permanently incorrigible and requires courts to make a factual finding on incorrigibility. Respondent Mississippi counters that the Eighth Amendment imposes no such requirement, claiming that the Supreme Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence only forbids states from imposing mandatory life without parole sentences on juvenile offenders. The outcome of this case has significant policy implications because it raises concerns of federalism, transparency in sentencing procedures, and impact on victims.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to interpret the judicial review provision of the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act, and to determine whether the statute provides for broad review of agency decisions, such as decisions to reopen or deny a reopening of past outcomes through the “any final decision” language of Section 355(f). Manfredo Salinas argues that the Supreme Court should construe the Railroad Unemployment Insurance Act’s provision broadly to permit judicial review of a United States Railroad Retirement Board decision not to backdate disability benefits. The United States Railroad Retirement Board counters that the statute grants the United States Railroad Retirement Board broad internal review and limits judicial review only to those decisions encompassed by the express language of the surrounding statutory framework. This case has important implications on the finality and reviewability of decisions that impact the duration and dollar amount of federally funded annuities.

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This case asks the U.S. Supreme Court to determine whether an entity that passively possesses a debtor’s property must turn over that property to the bankruptcy estate under the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stay provision. Petitioner City of Chicago argues that the automatic stay provision requires debtors and creditors to maintain the status quo as of the petition date, which, among other things, means that creditors cannot take actions to control property of the estate. Chicago maintains that passive possession does not constitute action. Further, Chicago asserts that because the automatic stay freezes the status quo, debtors must seek a court order compelling the turnover of property lawfully repossessed pre-petition. Respondents Robbin L. Fulton and others counter that the automatic stay language plainly requires that all the debtor’s property be transferred to the trustee or debtor and that passive retention is an act of restraint in violation of the automatic stay. Additionally, Fulton and others contend that the turnover duty is mandatory and does not require a court order. The outcome of this case has important implications on debtors’ and creditors’ bankruptcy rights, public safety, and the financial well-being of debtors and local governments.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether a rape that occurred between 1986 and 2006 is subject to a five-year statute of limitations under the Uniform Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”). The United States argues that because military rape was punishable by death under the UCMJ at the time of the offense, there is no limitations period here. Michael Briggs counters that because military rape is not punishable by death due to the Eighth Amendment’s protection against “cruel and unusual punishment,” the UCMJ’s default five-year statute of limitations would apply to this instance of military rape. The outcome of this case will impact the extent to which the military may prosecute rape within its ranks and clarify whether military defendants are entitled to the same constitutional protections as civilian defendants.

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This case asks whether an officer’s intentional use of physical force to apprehend an individual constitutes a seizure for Fourth Amendment purposes, even if the officer does not successfully detain the individual or limit her freedom of movement. Officers Janice Madrid and Richard Williamson temporarily paralyzed Roxanne Torres’s arm after striking it with two bullets as Torres drove at them. Torres argues that based on the common law meaning of the Fourth Amendment and on the Supreme Court’s Fourth Amendment precedents, a person is seized where the officer intentionally applies physical force. Torres contends that although she drove over an hour away from the scene of where she was shot, the officers’ bullets striking her arm constituted a Fourth Amendment seizure. Officers Madrid and Williamson counter that a Fourth Amendment physical-force seizure requires more. The officers maintain that to successfully complete a Fourth Amendment seizure, they would have had to intentionally acquire physical control, which did not occur because Torres fled from the scene. The outcome of this case has important implications for the balancing of interests respecting police conduct and public safety. 

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This case asks the U.S. Supreme Court to clarify the procedure for determining whether a noncitizen who has committed a state-level crime is eligible for cancellation of removal from the United States. The Immigration and Nationality Act of 1940 (“INA”) gives the U.S. Attorney General discretion to cancel a noncitizen’s removal if the noncitizen has not committed a crime involving moral turpitude (“CIMT”). Clemente Avelino Pereida was convicted of a state-level crime under a divisible statute. Three of the four crimes listed within the statute individually constitute CIMTs, but one crime does not. The convicting court did not specify Pereida’s crime of conviction. Pereida contends that he is not required to prove that he did not commit a CIMT and, therefore, that he is eligible for cancellation of removal because his conviction does not necessarily establish that he committed a CIMT. Attorney General William P. Barr counters that the INA requires noncitizens to prove that they did not commit a CIMT in such instances of ambiguity and that Pereida failed to carry his burden of proof. The outcome of this case has important implications for statutory interpretation and the removability of noncitizens who have prior criminal convictions.

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This case asks the U.S. Supreme Court to reconsider the extent to which a defendant’s contacts with a forum state must be related to the claim at issue in order to establish specific jurisdiction over the defendant. Petitioner Ford argues that there must be a causal relationship between the defendant’s in-state contacts and the plaintiff’s injury because the court in Bristol-Meyers Squibb Co. v. Superior Court of California disregarded the existence of similar causal relationships between the defendant’s in-state contacts and the injuries of third parties. Respondent Charles Lucero counters that a causal connection is not necessary to support specific jurisdiction in cases such as this where the defendant has marketed its products in the forum state and a person suffers an injury from one of those products within that state. The outcome of this case will clarify where manufacturers may expect to be subject to suit and will impact litigants’ ability to engage in forum shopping.

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