Cochise Consultancy Inc. v. United States, ex rel. Hunt

Issues

In a False Claims Act qui tam action in which the United States government does not intervene, under what circumstances may the relator rely on the statute of limitations set forth in 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b)(2)?

This case asks whether relators can benefit from the longer of the False Claims Act’s two statutes of limitations. The False Claims Act (“FCA”) contains two statutes of limitations, and circuits are split as to whether both statutes of limitations apply to private individuals. Cochise Consultancy, Inc. and the Parsons Corporation contend that, based on a contextual interpretation of the FCA, only the Act’s six-year statute of limitations, from when the cause of action occurs, should apply to relators. Billy Joe Hunt, the relator in this suit, counters that the plain language of the statute permits relators to benefit from the FCA’s three-year statute of limitations, which begins when an official of the United States learns the materials facts of the action, even when the United States is not a party. This case will likely impact the number and costs of suits brought under the FCA.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a relator in a False Claims Act qui tam action may rely on the statute of limitations in 31 U.S.C. § 3731(b)(2) in a suit in which the United States has declined to intervene and, if so, whether the relator constitutes an “official of the United States” for purposes of Section 3731(b)(2).

In 2006, Respondent Billy Joe Hunt worked for the Parsons Corporation (“Parsons”) in Iraq to fulfill Parson’s $60 million munitions clean-up contract with the Department of Defense. United States ex rel. Hunt v. Cochise Consultancy, Inc. at 1083–84. Parsons sought bids from subcontractors and initially awarded a contract to ArmorGroup.

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Smith v. Berryhill

Issues

When the Social Security Administration’s Appeals Council dismisses a disability claim for not being filed on time, does that dismissal qualify as an agency’s “final decision” subject to judicial review under Section 405(g) of the Social Security Act, codified at 42 U.S.C. § 405(g)?

The Supreme Court will determine whether a decision by the Social Security Administration’s Appeals Council rejecting a claim for disability benefits on untimeliness grounds is a “final decision,” and therefore subject to judicial review under Section 405(g) of the Social Security Act. Petitioner Ricky Lee Smith, supported by Respondent Acting Commissioner Nancy A. Berryhill, contends that the plain text of Section 405(g), as well as the Supreme Court’s interpretation of other administrative decisions, demonstrate that a decision on untimeliness grounds is a final decision for the purposes of judicial review. Amicus Curiae Deepak Gupta, who the Supreme Court to defend the Sixth Circuit’s judgment that such a decision does not constitute a “final decision” under Section 405(g), counters that Section 405(g)’s specific statutory context mandates that final decisions be understood only as decisions on the merits, not decisions on procedural grounds. This case will have important implications for untimeliness determinations, courts’ interpretations of final decisions, and social security litigation.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the decision of the Appeals Council—the administrative body that hears a claimant’s appeal of an adverse decision of an administrative law judge regarding a disability benefit claim—to reject a disability claim on the ground that the claimant’s appeal was untimely is a “final decision” subject to judicial review under Section 405(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. § 405(g).

Petitioner Ricky Lee Smith received disability benefits from Social Security between 1988 and 2004, until his financial resources increased to the point that he was no longer eligible for the benefits.  Smith v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec., 880 F.3d 813, 815 (6th Cir. 2018).

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Virginia House of Delegates v. Bethune-Hill

Issues

Does a state legislature have standing to appeal a district court’s order to enact a remedial redistricting plan; and, does that state legislature violate the Equal Protection Clause when it uses race to draw legislative districts during the post-census redistricting process to comply with the Voting Rights Act?

The Virginia House of Delegates argues that it not only has the proper standing to appeal the district court’s decision rejecting its redistricting plan, but also that race did not impermissibly predominate in the redistricting process. But even if race did predominate, the House further contends that its redistricting plan satisfies strict scrutiny because it must consider race to comply with the Voting Rights Act of 1965. Bethune-Hill and other Virginia voters as well as Virginia Attorney General Mark Herring respond that the House does not have standing to appeal because it does not suffer a particularized and concrete injury. Furthermore, Bethune-Hill notes that even if the House has proper standing, race predominated in the redistricting process and the redistricting was not narrowly tailored enough to survive strict scrutiny. The outcome of this case has implications on future cases in which legislative bodies may wish to intervene, as well as on racial gerrymandering challenges.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Whether the district court conducted a proper “holistic” analysis of the majority-minority Virginia House of Delegates districts under the prior decision in this case, Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Board of Elections, even though it ignored a host of evidence, including the overwhelming majority of district lines, which were carried over unchanged from the prior map; the geographic location of population disparities, which imposed severe redistricting constraints and directly impacted which voters were moved into and out of the majority-minority districts; and the degree of constraint the House’s Voting Rights Act compliance goals imposed in implementation, which was minimal;

2. Whether the Bethune-Hill “predominance” test is satisfied merely by a lengthy description of ordinary Voting Rights Act compliance measures;

3. Whether the district court erred in relying on expert analysis it previously rejected as unreliable and irrelevant and expert analysis that lacked any objective or coherent methodology;

4. Whether the district court committed clear error in ignoring the entirety of the house’s evidentiary presentation under the guise of credibility determinations unsupported by the record and predicated on expert testimony that should not have been credited or even admitted;

5. Whether Virginia’s choice to draw 11 “safe” majority-minority districts of around or above 55 percent black voting-age population (“BVAP”) was narrowly tailored in light of the discretion the Voting Rights Act afforded covered jurisdictions to “choose to create a certain number of ‘safe’ districts, in which it is highly likely that minority voters will be able to elect the candidate of their choice,” under Georgia v. Ashcroft, or the requirement the Voting Rights Act, as amended, imposed on covered jurisdictions “to prove the absence of racially polarized voting” to justify BVAP reductions towards or below 50 percent BVAP;

6. Whether the district court erred in ignoring the district-specific evidence before the house in 2011 justifying safe districts at or above 55 percent BVAP; and

7. Whether appellants have standing to bring this appeal.

After receiving the 2010 census results data, the Virginia state legislature (“General Assembly”) redrew the state’s legislative districts. Golden Bethune-Hill v. Virginia State Board of Elections (“Bethune-Hill I”), 326 F. Supp. 3d 128, 137 (E.D. Va. 2018). This included all 100 Virginia House of Delegates (“House”) districts. Id. The new, redrawn districting plan would go into effect for the 2011 election cycle. Id.

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Flowers v. Mississippi

Issues

Did the Mississippi Supreme Court properly consider the prosecutor’s Batson violations in the petitioner’s previous trials when evaluating whether the same prosecutor committed Batson violations in the petitioner’s most recent trial.

In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether the Supreme Court of Mississippi correctly held that the state prosecutor in Curtis Flowers’ criminal jury trial did not violate Batson v. Kentucky when he struck black prospective jurors. Flowers argues that the state court failed to properly consider the prosecutor’s history of Batson violations in his specific case, and that these violations—along with other indications of racial discrimination—demonstrate the prosecutor’s purposeful racial discrimination against black prospective jurors. Conversely, Mississippi argues that the state court properly weighed the prosecutor’s history of violations and correctly determined that the prosecutor’s reasons for striking black jurors were legitimate. The outcome of this case will help further define the scope of the Batson doctrine and determine how heavily a court should weigh an attorney’s history of Batson violations when assessing a Batson claim.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Mississippi Supreme Court erred in how it applied Batson v. Kentucky in this case.

Curtis Flowers (“Flowers”) has been tried six times in relation to four 1996 murders in Winona, Mississippi. Flowers v.

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Manhattan Community Access Corp. v. Halleck

Issues

Should private entities operating public access television channels be considered state actors per se for constitutional purposes subject to First Amendment limitations on governmental action, even when the state does not control the private entity’s board or operations?

The Supreme Court will determine whether the Second Circuit erred in creating a per se rule that private operators of public access channels are state actors subject to constitutional liability and holding that this is true even where the state does not control the private operator’s board or operations. Petitioners, Manhattan Community Access Corporation et al., also known as Manhattan Neighborhood Network (“MNN”), argue that the Second Circuit violated Supreme Court precedent by determining the constitutional forum question before the state actor issue. MNN also asserts that the public access channels at issue, properly examined under that precedent, would not warrant constitutional protections. Respondents, DeeDee Halleck and Jesus Papoleto Melendez (“Halleck and Melendez”) counter that New York City made the legislative decision to remove MNN’s editorial discretion, thereby designating the public access channels as a public forum warranting constitutional protection. Halleck and Melendez also contend that administering a public forum constitutes a public function, meaning that constitutional protections apply. From a policy perspective, this case is important because it may have implications for the editorial discretion of other private entities—such as YouTube and Twitter—that host expressive spaces open to the public, including government officials.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals in the 2nd Circuit erred in rejecting the Supreme Court’s state actor tests and instead creating a per se rule that private operators of public access channels are state actors subject to constitutional liability; and (2) whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit erred in holding—contrary to the U.S. Courts of Appeals for the 6th and District of Columbia Circuits—that private entities operating public access television stations are state actors for constitutional purposes where the state has no control over the private entity’s board or operations.

New York City (“NYC”) awarded Time Warner Entertainment Company, L.P. (“Time Warner”) cable franchises for Manhattan and required Time Warner to provide four public access channels for public use, in accordance with New York State regulations. Halleck v. Manhattan Community Access Corporation at 5.

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Mont v. United States

Issues

If an individual on supervised release commits another crime and is detained while awaiting trial, should that detention period be credited toward his term of supervised release?

This case asks the Supreme Court to interpret 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e) (“Section 3624(e)”), which provides that a defendant’s term of supervised release is tolled when the defendant is convicted of a crime. Jason Mont contends that his pretrial detention from an unrelated crime did not toll his supervised release. Instead, he claims that his supervised release expired during his pretrial detention period, and thus that the district court did not have proper jurisdiction over his case. The United States, on the other hand, argues that confinement in the form of pretrial detention is equivalent to a conviction for purposes of Section 3624(e), and that the statute tolls a defendant’s term of supervised release to avoid allowing a defendant to serve his term of supervised release while imprisoned. The outcome of this case has implications for understanding the connection between conviction, pretrial detention, and when a defendant’s supervised release is tolled.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a statute directed to the administration of imprisoned individuals serves as authority to alter or suspend the running of a criminal sentence of supervised release, when such "tolling'' is without judicial action, and requires the term "imprisonment" as used in the administrative statute, to include pretrial detention prior to an adjudication of guilt. Is a district court required to exercise its jurisdiction in order to suspend the running of a supervised release sentence as directed under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(i) prior to expiration of the term of supervised release, when a supervised releasee is in pretrial detention, or does 18 U.S.C. § 3624(e) toll the running of supervised release while in pretrial detention?

In December 2005, Jason Mont was convicted for possessing cocaine with intent to distribute and for being a felon in possession of a firearm. United States v. Mont at 1.

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The American Legion v. American Humanist Association

Issues

Does the government-funded display and maintenance of a 40-foot-tall cross-shaped World War I memorial placed at a public highway intersection violate the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment because of its relation to Christianity?

This case asks the Supreme Court to resolve whether the state’s ownership and maintenance of a 40-foot-tall World War I memorial shaped like a Latin cross violates the Establishment Clause of the First Amendment. Petitioner American Legion proposes that the Court adopt a standard for Establishment Clause violations that focuses on coercion, or whether the government compelled citizens to participate in religion. Under this standard, the American Legion contends that the memorial is constitutional because it is a passive display. Alternatively, co-Petitioner Maryland-National Capital Park and Planning Commission, argues that the memorial is constitutional because its purpose and meaning are secular. On the other hand, Respondent American Humanist Association asserts that that the Supreme Court’s existing Establishment Clause jurisprudence already relies on a clear standard—the Lemon endorsement test—and maintains that the memorial is unconstitutional under that test. They advance that the use of a Latin cross reflects a sympathetic preference for Christian soldiers, and claim that the size and permanency of the memorial adds to the monument’s endorsement of Christianity. The outcome of this case has grave implications for other existing monuments and memorials that incorporate religious symbols, and whether they will be allowed to stand.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

  1. Whether a 93-year-old memorial to the fallen of World War I is unconstitutional merely because it is shaped like a cross.
  2. Whether the constitutionality of a passive display incorporating religious symbolism should be assessed under the tests articulated in Lemon v. Kurtzman, Van Orden v. Perry, Town of Greece v. Galloway or some other test.
  3. Whether, if the test from Lemon v. Kurtzman applies, the expenditure of funds for the routine upkeep and maintenance of a cross-shaped war memorial, without more, amounts to an excessive entanglement with religion in violation of the First Amendment.

Prince George County, Maryland is the location of a World War I monument entitled the Peace Cross. Am. Humanist Ass'n v. Maryland-National Capital Park at 201, 208. Erected in 1925, the Peace Cross is placed in the middle of a public highway intersection.

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United States v. Haymond

Issues

Does 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k), which imposes mandatory sentencing for violations of supervised release conditions, deny criminal defendants their Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial?

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider the constitutionality of the sentencing requirements under 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k) (“Section 3583(k)”), which imposes a mandatory resentencing requirement for individuals who violate a condition of their supervised release. Specifically, the Court will consider whether Section 3583(k) denies criminal defendants their right to a jury trial under the Sixth Amendment. The United States argues that the mandatory sentencing is constitutional because the jury right only applies to the imposition of a sentence, while Section 3583(k) merely administers a sentence that had already been imposed. Haymond contends that Section 3583(k) imposes a new sentence for the conduct found to be a violation of the conditions of supervised release. This outcome in this case may have a meaningful impact on the interpretation of the Sixth Amendment and influence how courts determine which punishment to impose after a defendant violates conditions of probation or parole.  

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit erred in holding “unconstitutional and unenforceable” the portions of 18 U.S.C. § 3583(k) that required the district court to revoke the respondent’s 10-year term of supervised release, and to impose five years of reimprisonment, following its finding by a preponderance of the evidence that the respondent violated the conditions of his release by knowingly possessing child pornography.

After trial in the United States District Court for the Northern District of Oklahoma in 2010, a jury convicted Andre Ralph Haymond of one count of possession and attempted possession of child pornography in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 2252(a)(4)(B) and (b)(2).

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Mission Product Holdings Inc. v. Tempnology, LLC

Issues

Does a trademark licensee retain any rights under a licensing agreement following the debtor-licensor’s “rejection” of the agreement under Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code?

In this case, the Supreme Court will decide whether a debtor-licensor’s “rejection” of a trademark licensing agreement terminates the licensee’s rights under the agreement. Mission Product Holdings Inc. argues against termination, claiming that no such termination would occur from a breach of contract outside of the bankruptcy context, and that, in any case, there is a statutory exception that protects a licensee’s rights to use intellectual property post-rejection. Tempnology, LLC counters that rejection limits the licensee to the sole remedy of seeking monetary damages, and that the statutory exception for intellectual property does not contemplate trademarks as intellectual property. The outcome of this case will clarify the effect of rejection on contractual rights and whether trademarks are distinguishable from other types of intellectual property under Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, under Section 365 of the Bankruptcy Code, a debtor-licensor’s “rejection” of a license agreement—which “constitutes a breach of such contract,” 11 U.S.C. § 365(g)—terminates rights of the licensee that would survive the licensor’s breach under applicable non-bankruptcy law.

Respondent Tempnology, LLC (“Tempnology”) designs and manufactures accessories—such as towels, socks, and headbands—that remain cool while a user exercises. Mission Product Holdings, Inc., v. Tempnology, LLC, n/k/a Old Cold LLC at 3. In connection with these products, Tempnology owns a significant amount of intellectual property.

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Return Mail, Inc. v. United States Postal Service

Issues

Is the government a “person” who can petition the United States Patent and Trademark Office to review patent validity under the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act?

The Supreme Court will determine whether the government is a “person” for the purposes of post-issuance review proceedings under the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act (“AIA”). Return Mail, Inc. (“Return Mail”), the owner of a patent for processing undeliverable mail items, argues that Congress intended the AIA to incorporate a specific meaning of the term “person,” supported by statute and judicial precedent, that excluded the government, and would thus prohibit government agencies from initiating AIA review proceedings. The United States Postal Service (“Postal Service”) counters that the statutory context, as supported by historical evidence and statements made by the Supreme Court, reveals Congress’s intent to include government agencies in the term “person” for the purposes of the AIA. The United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit ruled that the term “person” in the AIA did not exclude the government, and that the government could petition for patent review under the AIA. Return Mail is now appealing that decision in a case that will have implications for patent litigation, the estoppel doctrine, and executive agencies.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the government is a “person” who may petition to institute review proceedings under the Leahy-Smith America Invents Act.

In this case, the United States Postal Service (“Postal Service”) has challenged the validity of Return Mail, Inc.’s (“Return Mail”) patent for processing undeliverable mail items. Return Mail, Inc. v. United States Postal Serv., 868 F.3d 1350, 1353 (Fed. Cir.

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