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Loi n°2021-1017 du 2 août 2021 relative à la bioéthique a élargi la procréation médicalement assistée à toutes les femmes qui ont un projet parental, aux couples lesbiens comme aux femmes célibataires (2021) Law No. 2021-1017 of 2 August 2021 on bioethics

Law No. 2021-1017 of 2 August 2021 on bioethics in France marks a significant step forward for single women and LGBT rights by extending access to Medically Assisted Procreation (MAP) to these previously excluded groups. Prior to this reform, MAP was only available to heterosexual couples facing medical infertility. The new law allows all women, whether in a heterosexual or lesbian couple or single, to benefit from these assisted reproductive techniques.

Loi n°2021-1774 du 24 décembre 2021 visant à accélérer l’égalité économique et professionnelle (2021) Law No. 2021-1774 of 24 December 2021 aimed at accelerating economic and professional equality

With the goal of boosting women's involvement in economic and professional activities, the "Rixain" Law of 24 December 2021 includes a number of measures aimed at achieving greater equality between women and men in French companies. This law introduces an obligation to ensure gender-balanced representation in management positions in large companies. Each year, companies with more than 1,000 employees must publish on their website any gaps that may exist in the representation of women and men among their senior executives and members of their management bodies.

Peru Political Constitution

The Political Constitution of Peru (the “Constitution”) has several articles that directly and indirectly support women’s rights and gender justice. The Constitution recognizes that the supreme purpose of society and the State is to defend and respect the dignity of human beings (Article 1).

Loi n°2021-478 du 21 avril 2021 visant à protéger les mineurs des crimes et délits sexuels et de l’inceste (2021) Law No. 2021-478 of 21 April 2021 to protect minors from sexual crimes and offenses and incest

Law No. 2021-478 of 21 April 2021 to protect minors from sexual crimes and offenses and incest (2021) introduces four new statutory offenses into the French Criminal Code to punish sexual acts against children: (i) the crime of rape against a minor under the age of 15; (ii) the crime of incestuous rape against a minor under the age of 18; (iii) the crime of sexual assault against a minor under the age of 15; and (iv) the crime of incestuous sexual assault against a minor under the age of 18.

Barnes v. Felix

Issues

When analyzing whether a law enforcement officer used excessive force, should courts consider context outside of the narrow time when the officer’s safety was threatened?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether courts should consider context outside of the narrow time when the officer’s safety was threatened when analyzing whether a law enforcement officer used excessive force. The Fifth Circuit applies the “moment of the threat” doctrine when analyzing the reasonableness of the use of deadly force by a police officer. Under the “moment of the threat” doctrine, the court can only consider the instance at which an officer deployed the deadly force in its reasonableness analysis. Barnes argues that the “moment of the threat” doctrine should be rejected because it contravenes precedents established by the Supreme Court and because it raises impossible line-drawing problems. Felix counters that the “moment of the threat” doctrine is consistent with precedent and is a straightforward analysis that does not raise line-drawing issues. The outcome of this case has strong implications for law enforcement and community relations.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether courts should apply the "moment of the threat" doctrine when evaluating an excessive force claim under the Fourth Amendment.

On April 28, 2016, Officer Roberto Felix, Jr. shot and killed Ashtian Barnes after a traffic stop. Barnes v. Felix at 2. Before the killing, the Harris County Toll Road Authority provided Felix with a plate number that had outstanding violations.

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Cunningham v. Cornell University

Issues

Must a plan fiduciary establish that services were necessary and paid for at a reasonable cost as an affirmative defense to a 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(C) prohibited transaction claim, or must a plaintiff plead and prove that services were unnecessary or unreasonably costly as an element of their prohibited transaction claim? 

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether an employee can state a claim that their employer violated the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) by alleging that the employer had third parties such as accountants, auditors, and financial managers provide services for their employee retirement plan. If yes, the burden of proof lies on employer defendants to establish that such services were necessary for the operation of the plan and paid for at reasonable cost if they wish to avoid liability. If no, a plaintiff alleging only that a prohibited transaction was entered into cannot survive a motion to dismiss. Casey Cunningham and other Cornell University Employees (“Cunningham”) stress that § 1106(a)(1)(C) of ERISA prohibits all transactions between plan fiduciaries such as employers and parties in interest such as service providers, regardless of whether other sections of ERISA create exemptions, so a plaintiff should not have to plead anything more than that such a prohibited transaction took place — at least to state a claim and survive a motion to dismiss. Cornell counters that common sense and other sections of ERISA — one of which § 1106(a) itself refers to — show that ERISA cannot mean even to presumptively prohibit transactions between plan fiduciaries such as employers and service providers such as accountants, auditors, and financial managers. The outcome of this case will resolve a split between the Courts of Appeals and determine how easily employee beneficiaries of retirement plans will be able to sue their employers for suspected mismanagement of those plans.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a plaintiff can state a claim by alleging that a plan fiduciary engaged in a transaction constituting a furnishing of goods, services, or facilities between the plan and a party in interest, as proscribed by 29 U.S.C. § 1106(a)(1)(C), or whether a plaintiff must plead and prove additional elements and facts not contained in the provision’s text.

Editor’s Note: The staff of the Legal Information Institute, including the students who wrote and edited this Preview, are employees of Cornell University.

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McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. v. McKesson Corporation

Issues

Is the district court in this case required to accept the Federal Communications Commission’s interpretation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act without reviewing the validity of the interpretation?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether a district court is required to defer to the Federal Communications Commission’s (“FCC”) interpretation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”) without reviewing the validity of the interpretation. Petitioner, McLaughlin Chiropractic Associates, Inc. (“McLaughlin”), argues that the Hobbs Act does not prevent district courts from interpreting the TCPA in private litigation. Respondents, McKesson Corporation and McKesson Technologies, Inc. (collectively “McKesson”), counter that FCC orders are binding and can only be reviewed by a court of appeals. McLaughlin asserts that FCC orders do not bind courts because they are interpretive rules. The outcome of this case will have major implications for the authority of federal administrative agencies. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Hobbs Act required the district court in this case to accept the Federal Communications Commission’s legal interpretation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act.

The Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”), as amended by the Junk Fax Prevention Act of 2005, makes it unlawful for any person to send unsolicited advertisements to a recipient’s telephone facsimile, or fax machine. 

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Food and Drug Administration v. R.J. Reynolds Vapor Co.

Issues

May a manufacturer file a petition for judicial review in a circuit (apart from the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia) where it does not reside or have its principal place of business, if the petition is joined by someone who sell the manufacturer’s products with that circuit?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether a manufacturer is allowed to file a petition for judicial review in a place besides the United States Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia, where it also does not reside or have its principal place of business, because the petition is joined by a seller of the manufacturer’s products that is located there. In this case, the Food and Drug Administration denied R.J. Reynolds Vapor Co.’s premarket tobacco product application, and R.J. Reynolds Vapor Co. sought judicial review of this administrative order along with certain retail sellers. The Food and Drug Administration argues that filing a petition for review based on a retail seller’s residence or principal place of business is improper because retail sellers are not covered within the Tobacco Control Act’s zone of interests, the Tobacco Control Act would prohibit retailers from obtaining judicial review, and venue must be proper for all petitioners. R.J. Reynolds Vapor Co. counters that their petition is proper because retail sellers are covered within the Tobacco Control Act’s zone of interests, the Tobacco Control Act would allow retail sellers to obtain judicial review, and venue only needs to be proper for a single petitioner. This case has important implications for the regulation of e-cigarettes, retail sellers of tobacco products, and forum shopping.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a manufacturer may file a petition for review in a circuit (other than the U.S. Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit) where it neither resides nor has its principal place of business, if the petition is joined by a seller of the manufacturer’s products that is located within that circuit.

In 2009, Congress passed the Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (“TCA”), giving the Food and Drug Administration (“FDA”) the authority to regulate tobacco products, including e-cigarettes. R.J. Reynolds Vapor Co. v.

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Stanley v. City of Sanford, Florida

Issues

Under the Americans with Disabilities Act, does a former employee lose her right to sue over discrimination with respect to post-employment benefits solely because she no longer holds her job?

This case asks the Supreme Court whether a former employee can sue over discrimination under the Americans with Disabilities Act after they have already left their job. Stanley argues that retirees, such as herself, have the right to sue regardless of whether they meet the definition of a qualified individual, and alternatively, that she qualifies as an eligible qualified individual even though she is suing post-employment. Sanford contends that Stanley did not previously argue that retirees have the right to sue regardless of their status as qualified individuals and has therefore waived her right to make this argument. Moreover, Sanford maintains that Stanley does not meet the definition of a qualified individual because Congress did not intend for employees to sue under the ADA post-employment. The outcome of this case has implications for disabled employees’ retirement benefits and the economic freedom of both employers and cities. 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, under the Americans with Disabilities Act, a former employee — who was qualified to perform her job and who earned post-employment benefits while employed — loses her right to sue over discrimination with respect to those benefits solely because she no longer holds her job.

In 1999, Karyn Stanley became a firefighter for the City of Sanford, Florida and served for over fifteen years before being diagnosed with Parkinson’s disease in 2016. Stanley v.

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