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This case asks the Court to determine whether the enforcement scheme of S.B. 8, Texas’s law prohibiting abortion providers from performing abortions once a fetal heartbeat has been detected, shields the law from review in federal court. S.B. 8 delegates the enforcement of the law to private citizens, allowing them to file civil claims against abortion providers. Petitioner Whole Woman’s Health challenges the law in federal court, seeking to enjoin Texas state officials—including judges and judicial clerks —from enforcing the law, because as members of the judiciary they would be required to adjudicate S.B. 8 claims. Respondents Judge Austin Jackson, and other state officials, reply that, because the law explicitly delegates enforcement to private citizens, they cannot be enjoined from performing judicial functions under the doctrine of state sovereign immunity. The case has significant implications for accessing abortions and for protecting constitutional rights. 

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine to what extent proceedings to vacate or enforce an award under the Federal Arbitration Act (“FAA”) belong in federal court. The Supreme Court has previously decided that motions to compel arbitration can be heard in federal court if there is a federal question when the court “looks through” to the underlying claim. Denise Badgerow contends that the Supreme Court’s look-through approach does not apply to post-award proceedings; in her view, a plain reading of the FAA deprives federal district courts of jurisdiction to adjudicate post-award claims. Walters counters that federal district courts have subject-matter jurisdiction in such instances, and that a motion to vacate an arbitration award does not deprive federal courts of subject-matter jurisdiction over underlying controversies. The outcome of this case has serious implications for future parties to arbitration proceedings under the FAA and for the federal district courts’ authority to enforce arbitration awards.

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This case asks the Supreme Court whether First Amendment prohibits an elected body from censuring one of its members in response to the member’s protected speech. The Houston Community College System Board of Trustees censured David Buren Wilson, one of its elected members, after Wilson criticized the Board’s management. Petitioner Houston Community College System argues that a censure is essentially the expression of a collective opinion that cannot cause any harm cognizable under the First Amendment. Respondent David Buren Wilson responds that a censure is inherently punitive and that, in this case, the censure caused him pecuniary injury because it deprived him of access to certain funds.  This case will determine whether the First Amendment sets limits on the ability of elected bodies, such as legislatures and school boards, to discipline members for speech that a majority considers objectionable.  

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether New York’s discretionary gun permit law, which requires an applicant demonstrate “proper cause” to carry a weapon for self-defense purposes, violates the Second Amendment. Robert Nash and Brandon Koch applied for a general concealed carry permit under New York law, but their applications were denied by Richard McNally for lack of proper cause. New York State Rifle & Pistol Association (“NYSRPA”) contends that at least one of its members would be eligible for a concealed carry permit but for New York’s proper cause requirement. Petitioners Nash, Koch, and NYSRPA brought a Section 1983 claim challenging the law, arguing that it violates their Second Amendment right to bear arms. Respondents McNally and Kevin Bruen—the superintendent of the New York State Police—counter that the law is a valid exercise of New York’s regulatory power. This case has important implications for the future of gun ownership and regulation, public safety, and racial discrimination.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the uniformed services exemption under the Social Security Act applies to the Civil Service Retirement System pensions of dual-status technicians. Petitioner David Babcock argues that the entirety of his service as a dual-status technician was as a uniformed member of the National Guard and he thus should entirely fall under the exemption. The Social Security Administration, under Acting Commissioner Kilolo Kijakazi, argues that the portion of Babcock’s service as a dual-status technician that was compensated by the Civil Service Retirement System pension was performed in his capacity as a civilian employee and therefore it should not fall under the exemption. The outcome of this case will impact the benefits available to dual-status technicians and clarify the distinction between dual-status technicians and other military personnel.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether it is appropriate for an attorney general to intervene in a case when no other governmental representative will defend the state law, despite the attorney general’s voluntary dismissal and contradictory stipulations in the case.  After the Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision to prohibit the enforcement of a Kentucky law, the Secretary of Kentucky's Cabinet for Health and Family chose not to appeal the Sixth Circuit’s decision and Attorney General Daniel Cameron (“Cameron”) moved to intervene as a third-party to continue defending the law. Cameron argues that the court should consider the importance of the state’s legal interests, maintaining that states have the authority to decide who represents them in court, and that the Sixth Circuit abused its discretion by not permitting his intervention.  EMW Women’s Surgical Center (“EMW”) counters that Kentucky’s interests were protected because the Attorney General’s office left the initial suit voluntarily and agreed to be bound by the final judgment.  EMW contends that the Attorney General’s office should not receive unique exemptions from procedural rules, with intervention being appropriate at the appellate level in rare circumstances only.  The outcome of this case has important implications for separation of power between the state and the federal government and for the court’s application of procedural law to state-government litigants.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the “favorable termination” element of a Section 1983 claim alleging unreasonable seizure requires a petitioner to show that the criminal proceedings at issue terminated in a way that is consistent with his innocence. Petitioner Larry Thompson brought a Section 1983 claim against his arresting officers for violating his Fourth Amendment rights after his criminal charges were dismissed “in the interest of justice,” with no further explanation regarding Thompson’s innocence or guilt. Thompson claims that his criminal proceedings terminated favorably, but Respondent Paigel Clark—an arresting police officer— argues that Thompson failed to meet this requirement, asserting that charges must be dismissed in a way that affirmatively indicates innocence. This case has important implications for the future of Section 1983 claims, prosecutorial discretion, and police officer accountability.

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This case asks the Supreme Court whether the Court of Appeals can invoke a precedential supervisory rule to require specific voir dire questions to potential jurors in high media profile cases. The case further asks if the Eighth Amendment and the Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994 were violated by not including mitigating evidence that would usually be excluded by the Federal Rules of Evidence Rule 403. Petitioner United States argues that the voir dire process should be left to the district court’s discretion, and there is no requirement to ask content-based questions about media exposure during voir dire. The United States also argues that the district court did not abuse its discretion in excluding certain mitigating evidence because the probative value was outweighed by the potential confusion and prejudice. Respondent Dzhokhar Tsarnaev responds that First Circuit precedent requires district courts to ask content-based questions to potential jurors if requested by one of the parties. Further, Tsarnaev contends that the Eighth Amendment and Federal Death Penalty Act of 1994 require mitigating evidence that would normally fall outside the scope of admittable evidence to be included in the sentencing phase. The decision in this case will affect the formation of juries, particularly in high profile cases, and the allowance of evidence in death-penalty cases.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to balance state criminal evidence rules and Sixth Amendment rights. New York’s opening-the-door rule allows the admission of otherwise inadmissible evidence if a party has given an incomplete and misleading impression of the issue. Under this rule, if a criminal defendant “opens the door” to responsive evidence, the defendant also forfeits their right to exclude that evidence on the grounds that it is barred by the Confrontation Clause. Darrell Hemphill contends that New York violated his Sixth Amendment right to confront his accuser by ruling that the state’s opening-the-door rule superseded the Confrontation Clause. New York argues that the opening-the-door rule does not infringe on Hemphill’s constitutional rights. The outcome of this case has heavy implications for a defendant’s rights under the Sixth Amendment and the states’ trial procedures.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to resolve a difference in judicial opinion among several federal courts of appeal regarding which standard is appropriate for granting federal habeas relief. Petitioner Ervine Lee Davenport (“Davenport”) contends that the approach taken by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 6th Circuit in Brecht v. Abrahamson, which requires that a defendant experience a “substantial and injurious effect” due to a trial error, is satisfactory. Respondent Mike Brown (“Brown”), Acting Warden, argues that the standard invoked by the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd, 3rd, 7th, 9th, and 10th Circuits in Chapman v. California should instead apply. For a federal court to grant relief under Chapman v. California, a trial error must not be “harmless,” and the state court’s interpretation of Chapman v. California must be “unreasonable” under the Antiterrorism and Effective Death Penalty Act of 1996 (“AEDPA”). The outcome of this case will affect how much deference federal courts give to state courts’ interpretations of AEDPA, as well as the ability of defendants to successfully obtain relief in federal habeas proceedings. 

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