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The Supreme Court will decide when Section 1113(2) of the Employee Retirement Income Security Act’s statute of limitations begins to run. Both parties agree that the text of Section 1113(2) establishes that the three-year statute of limitations runs from the date on which the plaintiff had actual knowledge of a violation, but dispute what actual knowledge means. Petitioner Intel Corp. Investment Policy Committee argues that actual knowledge means being in possession of proof of the violation, whether a plaintiff is aware of the violation or not. Respondent Christopher M. Sulyma argues that actual knowledge means when the plaintiff is fully aware and understands that a violation took place. The Court’s decision will affect both employers’ incentives to offer retirement plans and also employees who struggle to  comprehend the complex and lengthy plan documents provided to them by their employers.

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The Supreme Court will determine whether the government edicts doctrine renders uncopyrightable the annotations in the Official Code of Georgia Annotated (“OCGA.”) The government edicts doctrine prevents individuals from copyrighting government edicts—such as judicial decisions and statutes. The State of Georgia and the Georgia Code Revision Committee (“Georgia”) argue that the annotations—which were primarily written by private actors and do not carry the force of law—are beyond the scope of the government edicts doctrine. PublicResource.Org disagrees, arguing that because (1) the annotations are published under a state authority, and (2) Georgia’s Supreme Court treats the OCGA annotations as authentic sources of legal meaning, the annotations carry the force of law and are thus uncopyrightable under the government edicts doctrine. The Court’s decision will have implications for organizations’ abilities to provide low-cost or free public access to state laws and non-legal codes and standards (e.g. construction codes and standards).

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether state law or federal common law principles govern the ownership of a tax refund solely attributable to a single corporate subsidiary but received from the IRS by that subsidiary’s corporate parent as part of a consolidated tax return. Petitioner Simon E. Rodriguez, Chapter 7 Trustee for the bankruptcy estate of United Western Bancorp., Inc., contends that this area of law is not open to federal common lawmaking and thus should be governed by state agency law. Respondent Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, Receiver for United Western Bank, counters that the issue here is not governed by federal common law in the strict sense, but rather by interpretations of Internal Revenue Service regulations that inform private party contract interpretation. The outcome of this case will have implications on the equitable ownership interests of tax refunds issued to corporate parents on behalf of their subsidiaries as part of consolidated tax returns.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether private citizens can fashion their own cleanup remedies at federal “Superfund” sites. The Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability Act, commonly known as “Superfund,” allows the Environmental Protection Agency to create cleanup plans for polluted sites across the nation. Gregory Christian and other resident landowners (“Landowners”) near the Superfund site of Anaconda, Montana, sued the owner of the site, Atlantic Richfield, alleging that the company owed them damages to restore their properties to pre-pollution status. Atlantic Richfield argues that the Superfund Act preempts any party from seeking state-law restoration damages. The Landowners counter that the Superfund Act leaves room for additional damages beyond what the Environmental Protection Agency has already deemed appropriate. The Supreme Court’s decision will impact the certainty and finality of Superfund cleanups, private-property rights, and the balance of state and federal power.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether claims under Section 1981 can survive absent a showing that race was the but-for cause of the plaintiff’s harm. Here, NAAAOM sued Comcast for racially discriminating against ESN’s network by refusing to enter into a contract with them. Comcast argues that a plaintiff cannot successfully plead race discrimination if race was not the but-for cause—or the actual cause—of the refusal to contract. NAAAOM counters that the correct causation standard is a “motivating factor” or “mixed-motives” approach in which racial discrimination need only be one factor in establishing a claim under Section 1981. This case’s outcome could affect how Section 1981 and Title VII claims are brought by marginalized communities and how employers will allocate resources to handle litigation.

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This case consolidates three lawsuits, together claiming that the Department of Homeland Security’s (“DHS”) decision to rescind the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) policy is unlawful. Before the Supreme Court, DHS argues that the DACA rescission is unreviewable agency action, that it complied with the Administrative Procedure Act’s (“APA”) requirements, and that DACA is unlawful. In response, various states, individual DACA recipients, and organizations argue that DHS did not consider all data, failed to offer a sufficient justification for its decision, and improperly relied on the conclusion that DACA was unlawful. The case’s outcome will have important implications for the hundreds of thousands of current DACA recipients and their communities, immigration enforcement policies, and the economy.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether damages claims filed by private individuals against federal officers merit a judicial tort remedy, absent any other legal remedies. The parents of Sergio Adrian Hernandez Guereca—who was fatally shot on Mexican soil by a U.S. officer on U.S. soil—sued the U.S. officer, other unknown federal employees, and the United States. They argue that under Bivens, their damages claims should proceed despite the lack of statutory provisions because the essence of their claims is the same as Bivens and because no other legal remedy is available. Jesus Mesa, Jr., the Border Patrol agent who shot and killed Sergio, contends that the parents’ claims should be dismissed because the claims fall outside of Bivens given the “new context” they present and the “special factors” that warrant the Court’s caution in recognizing a Bivens action in this case. The outcome of this case has heavy implications for national security, separation of powers, and accountability of agents employing deadly force in foreign territories.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether, under 28 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1), an order denying a motion for relief from an automatic stay in a bankruptcy proceeding is a final order. Petitioner Ritzen Group, Inc. argues that an order denying stay relief is an interlocutory order—and thus not immediately appealable—because it merely affects the bankruptcy claims-adjudication process by determining where the parties can resolve underlying claims. Respondent Jackson Masonry, LLC argues that an order denying stay relief is final and subject to immediate appeal because proceedings deciding motions for stay relief are distinct from the overall bankruptcy proceeding and involve discrete claims, procedural standards, and legal standards. The outcome of this case will have implications on the judicial efficiency of bankruptcy litigation.

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This case asks the U.S. Supreme Court to resolve the circuit split regarding the interpretation of the stop-time rule in the context of removal proceedings and to determine what it means to be considered “inadmissible” under the rule. The stop-time rule is a limitation on the Attorney General’s power to cancel the removal of an alien and applies, in part, when the alien commits an offense listed under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2) that renders the alien “inadmissible.” Andre Martello Barton (“Barton”) argues that he cannot be deemed “inadmissible” under the stop-time rule because he was not seeking admission into the United States and, as a result, was never adjudicated as inadmissible. Alternatively, Barton asserts that it is a legal impossibility for him to be rendered “inadmissible” because he is an already-admitted lawful permanent resident of the United States. U.S. Attorney General William Barr counters that, for stop-time purposes, an alien is “inadmissible” if the alien is convicted of or admits to committing an offense listed under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2), regardless of whether the alien is seeking admission or already admitted. The outcome of this case has important implications for the removability of lawful permanent residents who have prior criminal convictions.

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This case arises out of an incident in 2004 when the Athos I, a ship that CITGO Asphalt Refining Co. (“CARCO”) had chartered, collided with an abandoned anchor near CARCO’s designated port. This case asks the Supreme Court to decide how to interpret the charter agreement’s “safe berth” clause, under which CARCO was obligated to designate a safe destination port for the Athos I. CARCO argues that, under the safe berth clause, it was obligated only to exercise due diligence in selecting a safe port. Frescati Shipping Co. (“Frescati”), the Athos I’s owner, counters that the clause is better interpreted as a warranty of safety that gives rise to strict liability. The outcome of this case will determine the contours of a charterer’s obligations under safe berth clauses and the degree to which industry actors can efficiently bargain to allocate risks before accidents occur.

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