Culley v. Marshall

Issues

In post-seizure civil forfeiture proceedings, does due process require an additional “retention hearing” and in analyzing that question, should a district court apply Barker v. Wingo’s speedy-trial test, or the three-part analysis announced by Mathews v. Eldridge?

This case asks the Supreme Court to balance a civil forfeiture claimant’s due process rights against a state’s interests in forfeiture and procedural efficiency. Under Alabama state law, the State is required to file a motion for forfeiture proceedings promptly after the seizure of property. In the interim, the statute allows claimants to request return of property believed to be illegally seized, and to post a bond worth twice the value of the property. Lena Sutton and Halima Culley contend that Alabama violated their due process rights by failing to provide a retention hearing and urge the Court to apply the standard from Mathews v. Eldridge to determine whether Alabama’s civil forfeiture processes are sufficient. Steve T. Marshall, Attorney General of Alabama, counters that due process does not require more than the State’s timely initiation of proceedings and thus urges the Court to apply the speedy-trial test from Barker v. Wingo. The outcome of this case has significant implications for the future of private property rights and state interests in civil asset forfeiture cases.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether district courts, in determining whether the due process clause requires a state or local government to provide a post-seizure probable-cause hearing prior to a statutory judicial-forfeiture proceeding and, if so, when such a hearing must take place, should apply the “speedy trial” test employed in United States v. $8,850 and Barker v. Wingo or the three-part due process analysis set forth in Mathews v. Eldridge.

Petitioners Halima Culley and Lena Sutton both owned vehicles that were seized under Alabama laws which allow the state to hold, subject to civil forfeiture proceedings, property used to facilitate drug crimes. Culley v. Attorney Gen. at 2. On February 17, 2019, Culley’s son was pulled over while driving and arrested for possession of marijuana and drug paraphernalia.

Additional Resources

  • Lydia Wheeler, Car Seizures Are New Test for Justices on Property Rights, Bloomberg Law (April 17, 2023).
  • Marco Poggio, Justices to Hear Wheether Post-Seizure Hearings Are Required,
    Law360 (April 21, 2023).
  • John Sharp, Alabama Civil Asset Forfeiture Faces Consitutional Challenges as Lawmakers Ponder Reform, AL.com (October 07, 2019).
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Murray v. UBS Securities, LLC

Issues

Does a plaintiff bringing a claim for retaliation under §1514A of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002 bear the burden of establishing the employer acted with retaliatory intent, or must the defendant employer demonstrate a lack of retaliatory intent as part of its defense?

This case asks the Supreme Court to clarify whistleblowers’ evidentiary burden when they allege retaliation for conduct protected under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002. Petitioner Trevor Murray argues that he does not need to prove retaliatory intent to establish a claim against his employer because the language of §1514A and the statutory and administrative precedent establish that the protected activity only needs to be a contributing factor in the adverse personnel action. Respondent UBS argues that employees should be required to prove that their employers acted with retaliatory intent in their initial complaints because the texts of the statute and statutory precedent reflect Congress’s intention to create an intent element. The outcome of this case will determine the amount of proof required for whistleblowers to prove retaliation for protected activities.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, following the burden-shifting framework that governs cases under the Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, a whistleblower must prove his employer acted with a “retaliatory intent” as part of his case in chief, or whether the lack of “retaliatory intent” is part of the affirmative defense on which the employer bears the burden of proof.

In 2011, Respondent UBS Securities, LLC hired Petitioner Trevor Murray as a strategist, a role that required him to certify that his reports “accurately reflected his own views” and that his compensation was not tied to his views. Murray v.

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Great Lakes Insurance SE v. Raiders Retreat Realty Co., LLC

Issues

Is a provision of a maritime contract specifying which state’s substantive law applies in case of a contract dispute unenforceable if that choice is contrary to the strong public policy of another state whose law would otherwise apply?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether state public policy can impact the enforcement of a choice-of-law provision in a maritime contract. Great Lakes Insurance disputed an insurance claim for Raiders Retreat’s yacht and contends that under the choice-of-law provision in their contract, federal maritime law or, alternatively, New York law applied. Great Lakes argues that such provisions are presumptively enforceable under federal maritime law unless they are contrary to federal public policy. Raiders argues that state public policy can override the presumption of enforceability of choice-of-law provisions, and the state law or Restatement provisions followed by many states should apply. The outcome of this case bears important consequences on whether federal or state law should govern questions of maritime commerce, and whether courts should prioritize uniformity of law over state sovereignty.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether, under federal admiralty law, a choice-of-law provision in a maritime contract can be rendered unenforceable if enforcement is contrary to the “strong public policy” of the State whose law is displaced.

Raiders Retreat Realty (“Raiders”) is a company headquartered in Pennsylvania. Great Lakes Ins. SE v. Raiders Retreat Realty Co. (“Third Circuit”) at 227. Raiders owns a yacht, which has its hailing port in Pennsylvania. Brief for Respondent, Raiders Retreat Realty Co.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Diogo Magalhães for his insights into this case.

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Alexander v. South Carolina NAACP

Issues

Did the South Carolina redistricting process violate the Equal Protection Clause in setting a racial target in the design process for one of its districts?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the district court panel erred in ruling that South Carolina’s Congressional District 1 (“CD1”) was a racial gerrymander prohibited by the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Appellee the South Carolina State Conference of the NAACP (“the NAACP”) asserts that the panel correctly found that the redistricting board set a 17% black voting age population (“BVAP”) target for their new map of CD1 to create a partisan tilt favoring Republican candidates. Appellant Thomas Alexander (“Alexander”) asserts that racial data was not a factor in the redistricting process and that, instead, the designers of CD1 relied on political data, mainly the precinct-level voting patterns from the 2020 election. Thus, Alexander argues that CD1 does not violate equal protection jurisprudence which permits a political, but not racial, gerrymander. Because of the small majority the Republican Party holds in the US House of Representatives, this case has the potential to have a major shift on both South Carolina’s congressional delegation, but also the political tilt of the House as a whole.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether the district court erred when it failed to apply the presumption of good faith and to holistically analyze South Carolina Congressional District 1 and the South Carolina General Assembly’s intent;

(2) whether the district court erred in failing to enforce the alternative-map requirement in this circumstantial case;

(3) whether the district court erred when it failed to disentangle race from politics;

(4) whether the district court erred in finding racial predominance when it never analyzed District 1’s compliance with traditional districting principles;

(5) whether the district court clearly erred in finding that the General Assembly used a racial target as a proxy for politics when the record showed only that the General Assembly was aware of race, that race and politics are highly correlated, and that the General Assembly drew districts based on election data; and

(6) whether the district court erred in upholding the intentional-discrimination claim when it never even considered whether—let alone found that—District 1 has a discriminatory effect.

In 2022, the South Carolina Senate adopted a reapportionment plan (“Senate Plan”) to redesign the congressional districts.  South Carolina State Conf. of the NAACP v Alexander at 6-7.  Although Congressional districts should have almost equal population, Congressional District No.

Additional Resources

  • Zack Montellaro, Supreme Court to hear racial redistricting case from South Carolina, Politico (May 15, 2023).
  • Caitlin Byrd, Federal judges strike down SC’s 1st Congressional District as racial gerrymandering, The Post and Courier (Jan. 6, 2023).
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Pulsifer v. United States

Issues

Is the “safety valve” provision of 18 U.S.C § 3553(f)(1)—which allows reduced sentences for certain criminal defendants—unavailable only for defendants who, under the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, have more than four criminal history points, a prior three point offense and a prior nonviolent two point offense, or are defendants ineligible if they meet even one of the listed categories?

This case asks the court to analyze 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1), which establishes which criminal defendants can receive reduced sentences under the federal “safety valve” provision and determine whether a defendant is ineligible for safety valve relief only when they meet all three of § 3553(f)(1)’s listed criteria, or if they become ineligible after meeting even one of the three criteria. Pulsifer argues that all three listed criteria must be met for the defendant to be disqualified from safety valve relief, because the “and” which connects the three offense categories is used in the joint sense and bundles the three offense categories together. Pulsifer points to the plain meaning of the statute and Congress’s intent to introduce lenity in sentencing for some criminal defendants. In opposition, the United States argues that the “and” is distributive in this context and effectively functions as an “or”. Therefore, the United States argues, a defendant is disqualified from safety valve relief if they meet even one of the three offense criteria. The United States further maintains that a distributive “and” is required for a proper reading because reading the statute otherwise would render its text arbitrary and redundant. The United States also posits that a distributive “and” would protect the general public from habitual offenders and satisfy Congress’s goal of combating recidivism. This case touches on important questions regarding sentencing guidelines for drug offenses, leniency in sentencing, and the interpretation of federal sentencing statutes.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a defendant satisfies the criteria in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(f)(1) as amended by the First Step Act of 2018 in order to qualify for the federal drug-sentencing “safety valve” provision so long as he does not have (a) more than four criminal history points, (b) a three-point offense, and (c) a two-point offense, or whether the defendant satisfies the criteria so long as he does not have (a), (b), or (c).

In 2018, Congress passed the First Step Act. Brief for Petitioner, Pulsifier at 8. This Act altered statutes relating to “safety valve” relief, which permits courts to issue sentences below the statutory minimum for defendants who meet certain criteria.

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Consumer Financial Protection Bureau v. Community Financial Services Ass’n of America

Issues

Does the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s funding structure violate the Constitution’s Appropriations Clause because it draws money directly from the Federal Reserve’s proceeds, and, if so, should the Court vacate its Payday Lending Rule?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s (“CFPB”) funding structure is constitutional under the Appropriations Clause. The CFPB argues that the text of the Appropriations Clause, in conjunction with its historical and modern understandings, supports its existing funding structure. Consumer Financial Services Association of America counters that the Appropriations Clause requires Congress to make a valid appropriation, and the current funding structure does not satisfy this requirement. The outcome of this case has serious implications for the regulation of financial markets and for consumers who borrow from financial institutions.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the court of appeals erred in holding that the statute providing funding to the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, 12 U.S.C. § 5497, violates the appropriations clause in Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution, and in vacating a regulation promulgated at a time when the Bureau was receiving such funding.

After the financial crisis of 2008, Congress enacted the Consumer Financial Protection Act which created the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (“CFPB”). 12 U.S.C. §§ 5481–5603.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Jed Stiglitz for his guidance and insights into this case.

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Acheson Hotels, LLC v. Laufer

Issues

Can an individual who proclaims oneself as an Americans with Disabilities Act “tester” and has no intention to visit a place of public accommodation legally challenge that place of accommodation for failing to provide information on disability accessibility?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide on the Article III standing question where a self-appointed Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) “tester” challenges a hotel reservation website’s failure to disclose information about disability accessibility. Petitioner Acheson Hotels, LLC argues that Respondent Deborah Laufer lacks standing because she failed to assert any concrete, stigmatic, or emotional injury resulting from the missing accessibility information. In opposition, Laufer contends that Acheson’s discrimination against disabled people is the exact type of harm Congress intended to prevent by enacting the ADA. While Acheson further asserts that the case is moot because the website now complies with the ADA regulations, Laufer counters that she suffers continuing injury from third-party websites. The outcome of this case will affect the balance between protecting small businesses from excessive litigation and ensuring tester-plaintiffs’ role in effectively enforcing the ADA regulations.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a self-appointed Americans with Disabilities Act “tester” has Article III standing to challenge a place of public accommodation’s failure to provide disability accessibility information on its website, even if she lacks any intention of visiting that place of public accommodation.

Respondent Deborah Laufer is disabled within the meaning of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”). Laufer v. Acheson Hotels, LLC. at 264. She relies on a wheelchair or cane to move around and has visual impairment.

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Yegiazaryan v. Smagin

Issues

Can a foreign plaintiff sue under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act for injury to intangible property?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether a foreign party can file a claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”) when they suffer injury to their intangible property. Respondent Vitaly Smagin alleges that Petitioner Ashot Yegiazaryan violated RICO by injuring his intangible property: a judgment Smagin previously secured against Yegiazaryan in the United States. Yegiazaryan argues that plaintiffs can only bring a RICO claim if the injury underlying such a claim has a domestic, and not foreign, locus. Accordingly, Yegiazaryan contends that the alleged injury to the judgment occurred outside of the United States and therefore is not cognizable under RICO. In contrast, Smagin argues that the injury occurred in the United States and consequently falls under RICO. The Court’s decision will impact the scope of RICO, as well as relations between the United States and other sovereigns.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a foreign plaintiff states a cognizable civil claim under the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act when it suffers an injury to intangible property, and if so, under what circumstances.

In 2010, Respondent Vitaly Smagin, a Russian citizen residing in Russia, obtained an $84 million judgment against Petitioner Ashot Yegiazaryan in an arbitration proceeding in London. Smagin v. Yegiazaryan at 565. Smagin had alleged that Ashot committed fraud against him in relation to a joint real estate investment in Moscow. Id.

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Tyler v. Hennepin County, Minnesota

Issues

Does the government violate the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment when it requires a homeowner who owed property tax to the government to forfeit their property worth more than such debt and then keeps the surplus proceeds?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the government violates the Takings Clause of the Fifth Amendment and the Excessive Fines Clause of the Eighth Amendment when the government forfeits a homeowner’s property due to a property tax delinquency and keeps the surplus proceeds of that property’s sale.  Petitioner Geraldine Tyler argues that her equity interest in her condominium is private property protected by the Takings Clause, and that the government violated the Takings Clause by selling her home and retaining proceeds in excess of her debt to the government.  She further contends that the forfeiture serves punitive rather than remedial purposes and thus is an excessive fine under the Excessive Fines Clause.  Respondent Hennepin County asserts that the government has the sovereign power to foreclose on properties to hold tax delinquents accountable.  Hennepin County also argues that tax forfeitures do not violate the Excessive Fines Clause because they are remedial and not punitive.  This case’s holding will impact the constitutional limit on the government’s power over individual property rights and the government’s ability to promote Minnesota productive land use.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether taking and selling a home to satisfy a debt to the government, and keeping the surplus value as a windfall, violates the Fifth Amendment’s takings clause; and (2) whether the forfeiture of property worth far more than needed to satisfy a debt, plus interest, penalties, and costs, is a fine within the meaning of the Eighth Amendment.

Petitioner Geraldine Tyler owned a condominium in Minneapolis and stopped paying property taxes on it when she moved into a new apartment in 2010. See Tyler v.

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Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians v. Coughlin

Issues

Does the Bankruptcy Code abrogate tribal sovereign immunity and thus subject Indigenous tribes to the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stays enjoining debt collection, or do Indigenous tribes retain sovereign immunity against the Bankruptcy Code’s automatic stays?

Note: The authors mirror the parties’ and courts’ use of the terms “Indian” and “Indian tribe” as legal terms in this Preview.

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether the Bankruptcy Code unequivocally expresses congressional intent to abrogate the sovereign immunity of Indigenous tribes. The Lac du Flambeau Band of Lake Superior Chippewa Indians argues that the Bankruptcy Code’s language is unclear, ambiguous, and subject to reasonable alternative interpretations, which fails to meet the high bar of an unequivocal expression of Congress’s intent. Brian W. Coughlin counters that there is no requirement for an explicit reference to Indigenous tribes, and that the ordinary meaning of the word “governmental unit” clearly shows Congress’s intent to abrogate the sovereign immunity of Indigenous tribes. This case touches on essential questions regarding tribal self-governance and abuse of the system of sovereign immunity.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Bankruptcy Code unequivocally expresses Congress’ intent to abrogate the sovereign immunity of Indigenous tribes.

Congress has authorized bankruptcy courts under 11 U.S.C. § 362(a) of the Bankruptcy Code (the “Code”) to enforce an automatic stay on debt collection efforts by creditors after the debtor has filed for bankruptcy.

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