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This case asks the Supreme Court to define the private right of action under Section 14(e) of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934. Gary Varjabedian and other Emulex Corporation shareholders contend that they have a right to file a private action against Emulex under Section 14(e). Emulex Corporation and Avago Technologies Wireless Manufacturing, Inc. counter that Section 14(e) does not allow a private cause of action based on negligence, and that a higher scienter standard should apply instead. The Supreme Court’s ruling will have significant implications for shareholders’ interests in the event of a merger.

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Erik Brunetti founded a clothing brand named “FUCT” and applied to register the name as a trademark. The registration was denied by the examining attorney at the United States Patent and Trademark Office for not complying with Section 2(a) of the Lanham Act, which prohibits registration of scandalous or immoral marks. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit concluded that the provision was an unconstitutional violation of the First Amendment of the Constitution. Brunetti asks the Court to affirm the lower court’s invalidation of the provision because it amounts to viewpoint discrimination warranting strict scrutiny review, which the provision then fails. Iancu asks the Court to reverse the lower court decision because the scandalous marks provision is viewpoint neutral and does not impose an unconstitutional burden on speech. Iancu argues that the Court should instead apply the rational basis review standard and recognize that the provision serves legitimate government interests in protecting the moral sensibilities of all audiences as well as the orderly flow of commerce. The Court’s decision may have a chilling effect on free speech in commercial contexts and make it difficult for owners of marks deemed scandalous or immoral to reap commercial benefits from their marks.

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In this case, the Supreme Court will determine whether a state in which a trust’s beneficiaries reside has the power to tax that trust’s income. Under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment, a state has the authority to tax an individual or entity—such as a trust—if that entity has “minimum contacts” with the state. North Carolina Department of Revenue argues that a beneficiary’s residence in a state provides sufficient minimum contacts between a trust and a state to authorize the state to tax the trust’s income. Kimberley Rice Kaestner 1992 Family Trust, on the other hand, contends that a state does not have the authority to tax a trust’s income based solely on the fact that beneficiaries reside in that state. The outcome of this case will determine the limits on state power to tax trusts and will have implications for all those involved in trust creation, management, and benefits.

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The Supreme Court will determine whether state wage-and-hour laws may supplement existing federal wage-and-hour laws for disputes arising on the Outer Continental Shelf (“OCS”) of the United States. The Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act (“OCSLA”) provides that state law that is “applicable and not inconsistent” with federal law may apply to cases on the OCS. The Fifth and Ninth Circuits, however, are split as to whether the OCSLA requires state law to only be used as a gap-filling device when federal law is not on point, or if state law may be used even when it supplements or overlaps with existing federal law. Petitioner Parker Drilling Company, Ltd. (“Parker Drilling”) argues that the text and legislative history of the OCSLA, as well as Supreme Court precedent, requires state laws to only be used as a gap-filling device when federal law does not address the issue. Parker Drilling also contends that even if state law can be used to supplement existing federal law, California wage-and-hour laws cannot be used because they are inconsistent with federal wage-and-hour laws. Brian Newton (“Newton”) counters that the text of the OCSLA allows for a more expansive use of state law that also includes supplementing existing federal law, as long as there is no conflict. Newton further asserts that California wage‑and‑hour laws can be applied here because they are relevant and compatible with existing federal wage‑and‑hour laws. From a policy perspective, this case is important because it may have implications for offshore drilling employer‑employee relationships and the responsibilities of federal officials administering the OCSLA.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether Auer deference—a rule that requires a court to defer to an agency’s reasonable interpretation of its own ambiguous regulation—ought to be overruled. James Kisor contends that the Auer doctrine is not part of the lawmaking authority that Congress has delegated to agencies, but it instead circumvents the limits that Congress has placed on their authority, is inconsistent with the U.S. Constitution, and lacks any policy justification. Robert Willkie, the Secretary of Veterans Affairs, counters that, while there should be significant limitations on Auer deference, altogether discarding the doctrine would have heavy practical consequences for both agencies and regulated parties. The outcome of this case will affect the ability of regulated individuals and entities to comply with agency regulations and to challenge agency interpretations of their own regulations.

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In this case, the Supreme Court will determine whether Maryland’s 2011 redistricting of the Sixth Congressional District constituted unlawful partisan gerrymandering in violation of the First Amendment, and whether the First Amendment retaliation framework used by the district court provided manageable standards to decide this case. Specifically, the Court will consider whether legislators redrew electoral maps in retaliation to citizens’ political affiliations and voting histories. Appellant Linda H. Lamone argues that although the redistricting process may be tainted by partisan bias, redistricting does not necessarily indicate an intent to punish citizens for their party affiliations and voting histories. Appellee O. John Benisek counters that the proper question is whether electoral maps were redrawn because of citizens’ political affiliations and voting histories, irrespective of malicious retribution. This case could have a meaningful impact on the scope of lawful electoral redistricting and whether the Court should consider legislators’ subjective intent when making this determination.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether 28 U.S.C. § 2342, commonly known as the Hobbs Act, required a federal district court to adhere to the Federal Communication Commission’s (“FCC”) interpretation of the Telephone Consumer Protection Act (“TCPA”). In 2016, Carlton & Harris Chiropractic sued PDA Network, after the latter sent an unsolicited facsimile announcing a free eBook edition of The Physician’s Desk Reference. Carlton & Harris argued that the fax constituted an advertisement for the purposes of the TCPA, which prohibits unsolicited advertisements. The United States District Court for the Southern District of West Virginia held that the fax was not an advertisement. The United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed, holding that, under the Hobbs Act, the district court had failed to properly defer to the FCC’s interpretation of the TCPA. PDR Network contends that the Hobbs Act does not undermine district courts’ ability to interpret the TCPA in civil suits between private litigants, and that the Hobbs Act should be construed narrowly, to facilitate judicial review and preserve separation of powers. Carlton & Harris argue that the Hobbs Act required the district court to defer to the FCC’s legal interpretation of the TCPA, maintaining that in agency actions such as this one, Congress has explicitly reserved interpretive powers to appellate courts. The outcome of this case will affect judicial decision-making, agency determinations and the corresponding deference, and the scope of the Hobbs Act.

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In this case, the Supreme Court will determine whether claims of partisan gerrymandering may be heard by the courts, and if so, upon what standards such claims should be evaluated. In 2016, North Carolina adopted a new congressional district map with the express purpose of protecting Republican congressional delegates. Federal district court judges from the Middle District of North Carolina invalidated the map after voters and related groups claimed that the new district map violated voters’ rights under the First Amendment, the Equal Protection Clause, and the Elections Clause. As part of this ruling, the lower court determined that there was an injury sufficient to give the voters standing while also holding that the issue of partisan gerrymandering is not barred from judicial review by the political question doctrine. The case was then appealed directly to the Supreme Court, which will seek to answer the procedural and substantive questions while wrestling with a large body of competing jurisprudence. The decision could potentially open the courts to additional challenges by voters in several states and have implications for the scope of lawful electoral redistricting.

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The Supreme Court will determine whether the Jones Act allows punitive damages to be awarded in a personal‑injury suit involving a breach of the general maritime duty to provide a seaworthy vessel. The Dutra Group contends that Supreme Court precedent supports the proposition that the Jones Act bars punitive damages in unseaworthiness cases because it does so in negligence cases, and they are simply alternative causes of actions for the same injury. The Dutra Group also argues that punitive damages were not historically awarded in pre-Jones Act unseaworthiness cases. Christopher Batterton counters that punitive damages have traditionally been available in general maritime claims at common law and that the Jones Act did alter the remedies available in general maritime suits prior to its enactment. Additionally, Batterton asserts that the Jones Act allows for recovery of punitive damages under certain circumstances. From a policy perspective, this case is important because it has implications on the American maritime industry’s ability to compete with the foreign maritime industry, as allowing recovery for punitive damages could increase the business costs and sales prices.

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This case asks whether relators can benefit from the longer of the False Claims Act’s two statutes of limitations. The False Claims Act (“FCA”) contains two statutes of limitations, and circuits are split as to whether both statutes of limitations apply to private individuals. Cochise Consultancy, Inc. and the Parsons Corporation contend that, based on a contextual interpretation of the FCA, only the Act’s six-year statute of limitations, from when the cause of action occurs, should apply to relators. Billy Joe Hunt, the relator in this suit, counters that the plain language of the statute permits relators to benefit from the FCA’s three-year statute of limitations, which begins when an official of the United States learns the materials facts of the action, even when the United States is not a party. This case will likely impact the number and costs of suits brought under the FCA.

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