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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether economic harms resulting from personal injuries are injuries to “business or property” for the purposes of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations Act (“RICO”). Commercial truck driver Horn ingested Dixie X to alleviate his back pain, after learning from the sellers that it contained no THC, even though it did. After testing positive for THC in a random drug test from his employer, Horn was fired. He then sued the sellers for injury to his business under RICO. Medical Marijuana, Inc. argues that ingestion of an unwanted substance like THC is a personal injury, and that economic damages from such an injury do not turn it into an injury to “business or property.” Horn claims that losing his job because of Medical Marijuana’s alleged fraud is an injury to “business or property.” This case has significant implications for the rights of human trafficking victims, the cost of doing business in consumer products, and the vitality of the hemp industry.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine the standard of review that the U.S. Court of Appeals for Veterans Claims (“Veterans Court”) should apply to claims on appeal. Bufkin argues that the Veterans Court must review the Secretary of Veterans Affairs’ and the Board of Veteran Appeals’ application of “the benefit of the doubt” where any evidence material to the veteran’s disability-benefits claim is in approximate balance. Further, Bufkin contends that in conducting this separate review, the Veterans Court is reviewing a matter of law, which requires a more demanding standard of review than clear error. McDonough counters that the Veterans Court is instead engaging in a factual review, arguing it should not reassess the facts to determine whether the benefit-of-the-doubt rule applies unless clearly erroneous. McDonough asserts that the Veterans Court need only consider whether the Department of Veterans Affairs properly applied the rule when raised. The outcome of this case has future implications for veterans’ disability benefits claims and the scope of the Department of Veterans Affairs’ powers.

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The questions for the Supreme Court to consider are: first, whether USCIS can revoke a visa petition on discretionary grounds based on non-discretionary reasoning; second, whether courts can examine this decision to revoke a visa petition; and third, whether an applicant can order a review of a court’s petition denial. Petitioner Amina Bouarfa argues that courts should be able to review discretionary USCIS decisions where the premise for the decision is non-discretionary, and that an applicant is entitled to a court review these decisions. Respondents Alejandro Mayorkas and the Department of Homeland Security counter that the plain statutory language of immigration law prohibits Article III court review of these discretionary decisions; and, instead, USCIS has control over reviewing and reversing immigration decisions. The outcome of this case will influence the balance of power between the executive and judicial branches.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether it is necessary for claimants to exhaust state remedies before bringing a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 in state court. Williams, et al. argue that the language of § 1983 and the Supremacy Clause compel states to hear § 1983 claims. Washington counters that state sovereignty allows states to create laws about their own courts’ jurisdiction regardless of whether this denies certain federal claims. This case has serious implications for plaintiffs’ choice of forum when bringing a § 1983 claim and on the allocation of power between state and federal governments.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the post-removal amendment of a complaint can defeat federal-question subject matter jurisdiction and preclude a district court from exercising supplemental jurisdiction over the remaining state law claims. On one hand, Royal Canin and Purina argue both that federal-question jurisdiction cannot be extinguished by amending a complaint and also that a district court can exercise supplemental jurisdiction even after the resolution of all federal claims. On the other hand, Anna Wullschleger and Gerald Brewer contend that the amended complaint determines federal-question jurisdiction, and a federal district court should not exercise supplemental jurisdiction when no federal claim remains in the lawsuit. The outcome of this case has heavy implications for forum manipulation and federalism.

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This case asks the Supreme Court if a party must win a case to get attorney’s fees or if it is enough to win a preliminary injunction that solves the underlying controversy of the case. Lackey argues that the Supreme Court should reject the Circuit consensus and decide that a preliminary injunction winner is not a “prevailing party” under 42 U.S. Code § 1988 to be consistent with the Supreme Court’s previous cases. Additionally, Lackey maintains that when the case has been resolved due to a voluntary change in the law rather than a judicial order, there is no “prevailing party” as defined by § 1988. Stinnie counters that the winner of a preliminary injunction does indeed “win” a case in the way Congress intended when it used the term “prevailing party.” Further, Stinnie contends that the voluntary change in the law was not necessary for them to achieve meaningful relief, so they have already “prevailed” over the other party. The Supreme Court’s decision, in this case, will impact federal, state, local, and municipal governments’ ability to protect the public interest, private attorneys’ ability to vindicate civil rights, and the workload facing lower courts. 

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine when a prosecutor’s nondisclosure of information requires retrial of a death row case. Richard Eugene Glossip, a death row inmate, asserts that the state hid information that a key witness in the case was under psychiatric care and failed to correct that witness’s lies about his psychiatric care. He argues that these actions, along with other failures to turn over information, violate his due process rights under Brady v. Maryland and Napue v. Illinois. Christopher G. Michel, the court-appointed amicus curiae arguing in support of the judgment in the lower court, argues that the undisclosed information was too unclear to vindicate Petitioner or affect the jury. He also argues that the court cannot hear this case, as held by the lower court on an adequate and independent state ground. The outcome of this case has significant implications for public confidence in the criminal justice system and the role of prosecutors.

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This case asks the Court to determine whether the Gun Control Act of 1968’s definition of “firearm” permits the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (“ATF”) to regulate weapons parts kits and incomplete frames and receivers. Merrick Garland, Attorney General, et al., argues that a natural reading of the word “firearm” includes weapon parts kits, incomplete frames, and receivers; and, that failing to regulate these items would create a loophole in the nation’s gun laws. Jennifer VanDerStok et al., counters that the rule is outside the scope of the ATF’s authority. This case touches on important questions regarding the Gun Control Act of 1968, and its ability to regulate ghost guns.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether a former president can be protected from criminal prosecution by presidential immunity for conduct while in office. Former President Trump, the Petitioner, argues that the Constitution’s Executive Vesting Clause, the Separation of Powers principle, and the Impeachment Judgment Clause grant former presidents absolute immunity from criminal prosecution for their official acts, while historical precedents and common-law immunity doctrines provide foundational support. Trump also contends that the clear-statement rule requires criminal laws to apply to the President only if explicitly stated by Congress. Trump further urges the Court to grant absolute criminal immunity for presidential official duties to maintain executive independence or, if considering qualified immunity, to require a clear legal violation. The United States counters that granting former presidents absolute criminal immunity conflicts with the Separation of Powers principles and the Impeachment Judgment Clause and lacks the support of historical precedent or common-law immunity principles. The United States argues that federal criminal statutes universally apply to the President, and the clear-statement principle does not justify a broad exemption since criminal statutes generally do not seriously threaten presidential powers. The United States also contends that any grant of immunity to a former president should not bar prosecution for charges related to alleged misuse of official powers undermining democratic processes. The decision will influence the application of presidential immunity, election processes, and the presidential right to make political speech.

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This case presents to the Supreme Court the issue of whether district courts should defer to the National Labor Relations Board’s (NLRB) preliminary investigations and legal judgments when deciding on preliminary injunctions under Section 10(j) of the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA) during unfair labor practice investigations. The Petitioner, Starbucks Corp., argues that the Sixth Circuit improperly weighted the scales in favor of the NLRB by deferring too much to the Board's initial assessment of the case and its labor-law expertise, thus undermining judicial independence and overstepping established boundaries of agency deference. The Respondent, the NLRB, maintains that such deference is warranted given its role, expertise in labor relations, and the comprehensive investigatory and adjudicative processes it undertakes before seeking injunctive relief under Section 10(j). The Court's determination will crucially affect the balance of power between administrative agencies and the judiciary and will have significant implications for labor practices and the enforcement of labor rights in the United States.

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