Haaland v. Brackeen

Issues

Does the Indian Child Welfare Act discriminate based on race and commandeer state apparatuses in the adoption placements of Indian children?

Note: The authors mirror the parties’ and courts’ use of the terms “Indian” and “Indian child” as legal terms in this Preview.

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”) violates the U.S. Constitution’s Fourteenth Amendment equal protection guarantee and contravenes anticommandeering principles rooted in the Tenth Amendment. Deb Haaland, Secretary of the United States Department of the Interior, argues that ICWA’s classification of “Indian child” is constitutional because the classification is political and tied to Congress’s “unique obligation” to Indian tribes. Haaland further contends that Congress has the power to regulate Indian child placement preferences under the Indian Commerce Clause. Chad Everet Brackeen asserts that ICWA’s classification of “Indian child” is race-based and violates the Equal Protection Clause. Brackeen also asserts that ICWA’s placement preferences exceed Congress’s authority by forcing state agencies to carry out federal laws. The outcome of this case has important implications for Indian children’s interests, tribal interests, and state sovereignty regarding the adoption proceedings of Indian children.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

1. Whether ICWA’s placement preferences— which disfavor non-Indian adoptive families in child- placement proceedings involving an “Indian child” and thereby disadvantage those children—discriminate on the basis of race in violation of the U.S. Constitution.

2. Whether ICWA’s placement preferences exceed Congress’s Article I authority by invading the arena of child placement—the “virtually exclusive province of the States,” Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393, 404 (1975)—and otherwise commandeering state courts and state agencies to carry out a federal child-placement program.

In 1978, Congress enacted the Indian Child Welfare Act (“ICWA”) to protect American Indian children from widespread removal from their native families and communities and placement in non-Indian homes. Brackeen v. Haaland at 28–29. Prior to ICWA’s adoption, 25 to 35 percent of Indian children were removed from their families.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Michael Sliger and Derril B. Jordan, Esq. for their guidance and insights into this case.

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Axon Enterprise, Inc. v. FTC

Issues

Does the FTC Act remove subject-matter jurisdiction from district courts to hear constitutional challenges to the FTC’s structure, procedures, and existence by providing for FTC administrative adjudication of antitrust issues and review of these decisions by the courts of appeals?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether claims brought by parties like Axon Enterprise, Inc. (“Axon”) that challenge the structure of the Federal Trade Commission can be reviewed by district courts prior to the completion of agency proceedings. Axon contends that federal district courts should be able to hear constitutional challenges to agency structure concurrently with agency enforcement proceedings because enjoining such proceedings is necessary to avoid “here-and-now” constitutional injury. The FTC counters that the Federal Trade Commission Act implicitly strips district courts of subject-matter jurisdiction over these challenges, making judicial review available only in the courts of appeals and only after a final order by the FTC. The case carries significant implications for administrative law because allowing businesses subject to FTC regulation to preemptively challenge agency proceedings could significantly scale back the agency’s enforcement powers.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether Congress impliedly stripped federal district courts of jurisdiction over constitutional challenges to the Federal Trade Commission’s structure, procedures, and existence by granting the courts of appeals jurisdiction to “affirm, enforce, modify, or set aside” the commission’s cease-and-desist orders.

The Federal Trade Commission Act (the “FTC Act”) empowers the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) to address the use of “unfair methods of competition” by initiating administrative proceedings and issuing cease-and-desist orders. Axon Enter. v. Trade Comm’n at 1189.

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Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. University of North Carolina

Issues

Can institutions of higher education use race as a factor in admissions?

The University of North Carolina considers an applicant’s race in its undergraduate admissions decisions. The Supreme Court previously held in Grutter v. Bollinger that such consideration is constitutional so long as race is one of many factors in a holistic review process and is used to enhance racial diversity at the institution. Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. argues that the Supreme Court should overrule Grutter and hold that the Constitution does not permit racial discrimination of any kind. The University of North Carolina contends that the Supreme Court correctly decided Grutter and that the Constitution permits universities to consider race when doing so provides increased racial diversity and therefore a better academic experience. The Court’s decision in this case has heavy implications for racial diversity in universities, race discrimination, university policies, and the academic experience.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether the Supreme Court should overrule Grutter v. Bollinger and hold that institutions of higher learning cannot use race as a factor in admissions; and (2) whether a university can reject a race-neutral alternative because it would change the composition of the student body, without proving that the alternative would cause a dramatic sacrifice in academic quality or the educational benefits of overall student-body diversity.

The University of North Carolina (“UNC”) believes that a diverse student body results in educational benefits. Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. v. University of North Carolina (“SFFA”) at 590–91.

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Students for Fair Admissions Inc. v. President & Fellows of Harvard College

Issues

Should the Supreme Court overrule Grutter v. Bollinger and hold that institutions of higher education cannot use race as a factor in admissions? Is Harvard College discriminating against Asian American applicants and rejecting workable race-neutral alternatives, thus violating Title VI of the Civil Rights Act?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether Grutter v. Bollinger should be overruled and whether universities should be prohibited from using race in the admission process, as well as whether Harvard violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act by discriminating against Asian American applicants in the admission process and by rejecting workable, race-neutral alternatives. Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. argues that Grutter should be overruled, that universities should not be allowed to use race as a factor in college admission, and that Harvard unlawfully discriminated against Asian American applicants. Harvard counters that Grutter should stand, that there are no workable, race-neutral alternatives, and that Harvard does not discriminate against Asian American applicants. This case has significant implications for future admission practices, diversity on college campuses, and racial minorities.

 

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether Grutter v. Bollinger should be overruled and institutions of higher education should be banned from using race as a factor in admissions; and (2) whether Harvard College violated Title VI of the Civil Rights Act by discriminating against Asian American applicants and abandoning race-neutral alternatives.

Students for Fair Admissions, Inc. (“SFFA”) constitutes a coalition of applicants and prospective applicants to institutions of higher education and their families, and includes at least one Asian-American member who applied for and was denied admission to Harvard.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Brian M. Richardson for his guidance and insights into this case.

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Jones v. Hendrix

Issues

Does a prisoner who did not initially challenge certain aspects of their conviction have the right to challenge their conviction later via habeas corpus after the Supreme Court changed the standard of conviction for the related crime?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine the extent to which habeas relief is available to a prisoner after a Supreme Court case heightens the standard of conviction for the crime they were convicted of. The relevant statutory provision, 28 U.S.C. § 2255(e)’s saving clause, allows a prisoner to move for habeas relief if alternative remedies available under other subsections of § 2255 are “inadequate or ineffective to test the legality of [their] detention.” Petitioner Marcus DeAngelo Jones argues that because the lower court applied the wrong substantive law, the alternative remedies were ineffective in testing the legality of his detention, and that he is therefore entitled to habeas relief under § 2255(e). Jones further argues that the Eighth Circuit’s interpretation of the statute renders § 2255(e) superfluous and violates many of Jones’s constitutional rights. Respondent Dewayne Hendrix counters that the § 2255(e) requires a showing of actual innocence, which he argues Jones cannot make, in order to trigger habeas relief, and that Jones’ constitutional concerns are misguided. The outcome of this case will determine the availability of post-conviction relief to prisoners following changes in relevant substantive law.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether federal inmates who did not — because established circuit precedent stood firmly against them — challenge their convictions on the ground that the statute of conviction did not criminalize their activity may apply for habeas relief under 28 U.S.C § 2241 after the Supreme Court later makes clear in a retroactively applicable decision that the circuit precedent was wrong and that they are legally innocent of the crime of conviction.

In December 1999, Marcus DeAngelo Jones was arrested at a convenience store in Columbia, Missouri as part of an undercover operation related to drug dealing. U.S. v. Jones at 808. At trial, the government introduced evidence showing that Jones had been in possession of a firearm on multiple occasions. Id. Jones possessed this firearm despite his several prior felony convictions.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor John Blume for his guidance and insights into this case.

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Cruz v. Arizona

Issues

Does Arizona’s requirement of a “significant change in law” before filing a petition for postconviction relief prevent the United States Supreme Court from reviewing the Arizona Supreme Court’s interpretation of federal law?

Court below

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether an Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure, which only allows postconviction relief if there has been a significant change in law to make it an adequate and independent state-law ground for the judgment, prevents federal review. Petitioner John Montenegro Cruz claims that the rule cannot apply because it conflicts with the Supreme Court’s precedent requiring the application of settled rules of constitutional law on postconviction review. Cruz also asserts that the rule requires consideration of federal law, and thus that the Supreme Court may review determinations made under it for consistency with federal law. Respondent, the state of Arizona, argues that its Rule prevents federal review because it is premised on a matter of state law, rather than federal law. Arizona asserts that its rule only regulates when a claim may be brought, not the rule to be applied when evaluating the claim.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Arizona Supreme Court’s holding that Arizona Rule of Criminal Procedure 32.1 (g) precluded post-conviction relief is an adequate and independent state-law ground for the judgment.

In 2005, John Montenegro Cruz was convicted of first degree murder for killing a police officer and was sentenced to death in a jury trial. State v. Cruz at 992.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professors John Blume and Keir Weyble for their guidance and insights into this case.

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Bittner v. United States

Issues

Does an individual commit a single violation or multiple violations under the Bank Secrecy Act when the individual fails to report multiple foreign accounts during a single reporting period?

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide an issue of statutory construction; specifically, on what basis should the Secretary of the Treasury evaluate taxpayer violations of the Bank Secrecy Act (“BSA”). The Bank Secrecy Act requires citizens with a financial interest in a foreign bank account to report that financial interest to the Commissioner of Internal Revenue for each year that the interest exists. Alexandru Bittner contends that evaluating violations under the Bank Secrecy Act on a per-form basis is consistent with the statute’s text, history, and purpose. The United States counters that the text of the Bank Secrecy Act clearly outlines that a violation occurs on a per-account basis, not a per-form basis, and that the statute’s history and purpose confirm this viewpoint. The outcome of this case has heavy implications for tax law, banking regulations, civil penalties for tax violations, and financial interests in foreign bank accounts.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a “violation” under the Bank Secrecy Act is the failure to file an annual Report of Foreign Bank and Financial Accounts (no matter the number of foreign accounts), or whether there is a separate violation for each individual account that was not properly reported.

Petitioner Alexandru Bittner is a dual citizen of Romania and the United States. United States v. Bittner, at 1. Bittner emigrated to the United States in 1982, where he obtained his American citizenship and lived until 1990, when he moved back to Romania. Id.

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Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith

Issues

Does a work of art that visually resembles its copyrighted source material, but conveys a different meaning, constitute fair use? Is a court permitted to consider meaning when evaluating copyright infringement claims?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether a work of art that visually resembles its source material but transforms its meaning constitutes fair use under copyright law. The Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts (AWF) argues that several screenprints created by Andy Warhol, which derive from an original photograph by Lynn Goldsmith, are transformative and constitute fair use because they portray a significantly different message than Goldsmith’s original photograph. Goldsmith argues that since her photograph is recognizable in Warhol’s prints and the works share the same purpose, the prints are not fair use but rather infringe her copyright in her photo. The outcome of this case carries implications for copyright holders’ economic incentives, marginalized artists’ commercial prospects, and creative expression.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a work of art is “transformative” when it conveys a different meaning or message from its source material (as the Supreme Court, U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, and other courts of appeals have held), or whether a court is forbidden from considering the meaning of the accused work where it “recognizably deriv[es] from” its source material (as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 2nd Circuit has held).

In 1981, Lynn Goldsmith, a prominent celebrity portrait photographer, took a photograph of the musician Prince. Andy Warhol Foundation for the Visual Arts, Inc. v. Goldsmith at 33. Goldsmith holds a copyright in the photo. Id.

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Reed v. Goertz

Issues

Does the statute of limitations for a federal law allowing prisoners the right to challenge a state’s post-conviction DNA testing regime begin to run as soon as the state trial court denies DNA testing or at the end of the state-court litigation, including all appeals?

This case asks the Supreme Court to resolve a circuit split and decide when the statute of limitations for 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claims for post-conviction DNA testing begin to run. Rodney Reed argues that the statute of limitations for his § 1983 claim for DNA testing should begin after the Texas Court of Criminal Appeals denied rehearing because this is the point at which he exhausted his state court options. Bryan Goertz counters that the statute of limitations should begin after the trial court denied Reed’s DNA testing request because this is when Reed first became aware that his right to DNA testing was allegedly being violated. The outcome of this case has significant implications for federalism, inmate rights, and the accuracy of the justice system.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the statute of limitations for a 42 U.S.C. § 1983 claim seeking DNA testing of crime-scene evidence begins to run at the end of state-court litigation denying DNA testing, including any appeals (as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 11th Circuit has held), or whether it begins to run at the moment the state trial court denies DNA testing, despite any subsequent appeal (as the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 5th Circuit, joining the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 7th Circuit, held below).

In 1996, 19-year-old Stacey Stites’ body was found on the side of a country road in Bastrop County, Texas. Reed v. Goertz, at 2. The medical examiner determined that Stites was strangled to death with her belt. Id.

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National Pork Producers Council v. Ross

Issues

Does a state statute violate the dormant Commerce Clause when its practical effect burdens out-of-state commerce?

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether California’s Proposition 12 violates the dormant Commerce Clause by failing the extraterritoriality doctrine and the Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc. balancing test. National Pork Producers Council (“NPPC”) argues that Proposition 12 violates the extraterritoriality doctrine by producing a “practical effect,” beyond its influence in California, that unduly burdens the integrated national pork market. NPPC also claims that Proposition 12 does not pass the Pike balancing test, as it imposes an undue burden on out-of-state commerce that is clearly excessive compared to its local benefits. Karen Ross, California’s Secretary of Food and Agriculture, counters that Proposition 12 regulates only the in-state pork market and that the opposing side’s expansive reading of the extraterritoriality doctrine may render it meaningless. Ross also argues that Proposition 12 survives the Pike balancing test. The outcome of this case has important implications for determining the scope of the dormant Commerce Clause as well as the extent of states’ police power.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether allegations that a state law has dramatic economic effects largely outside of the state and requires pervasive changes to an integrated nationwide industry state a violation of the dormant commerce clause, or whether the extraterritoriality principle described in the Supreme Court’s decisions is now a dead letter; and (2) whether such allegations, concerning a law that is based solely on preferences regarding out-of-state housing of farm animals, state a claim under Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc.

In 2018, California voters passed ballot initiative Proposition 12, which prohibits businesses from knowingly selling various meat products within California, unless the confinement of animals in the production process complies with certain restrictions.  See Nat’l Pork Producers Council v.

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