Lora v. United States

Issues

Does the prohibition on concurrent sentences in 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), which criminalizes using or possessing a firearm to commit crimes of violence or drug trafficking crimes, apply to defendants convicted under 18 U.S.C. § 924(j), which covers defendants who cause death through use of a firearm?

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether 18 U.S.C. § 924(j) is subject to 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)’s prohibition on concurrent sentences. 18 U.S.C. § 924(c) criminalizes using or possessing a firearm to commit a crime of violence or drug trafficking crime. To violate 18 U.S.C. § 924(j), an individual must, in the course of violating 18 U.S.C. § 924(c), use a firearm to cause the death of another person. Petitioner Efrain Lora argues that 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(d)(ii), which bars courts from sentencing defendants to concurrent terms of imprisonment, applies only to convictions under § 924(c) and not to convictions under § 924(j). Respondent the United States argues that, because § 924(j) can only be violated by also violating § 924(c), a sentence under Section 924(j) qualifies as a conviction under § 924(c) and must therefore also be subject to its sentencing requirements. This case has significant implications for federal sentencing law, including judicial discretion in sentencing.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(D)(ii), which provides that “no term of imprisonment imposed … under this subsection shall run concurrently with any other term of imprisonment,” is triggered when a defendant is convicted and sentenced under 18 U.S.C. § 924(j).

In 2002, Efrain Lora was trafficking narcotics in the Bronx. United States v. Lora at 1. In collaboration with four co-conspirators, he decided to kill Andrew Balcarran, a rival drug dealer, over threats Balcarran had made towards Lora and his co-perpetrators regarding their drug territory. Id. On the day of the murder, Lora acted as a scout.

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Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi

Issues

Should the enablement requirement of a patent claim focus on whether the disclosures simply enable skilled people in the field to “make and use” the claimed invention or whether the disclosures accurately enable the “full scope” of the invention – all variations of the invention that fall within the patent claim’s description of the invention; and, would a relatively easy trial-and-error procedure equate to undue experimentation?

This case asks the Supreme Court to clarify whether Amgen’s disclosure of common techniques – a trial-and-error procedure and amino acid substitution technique – is sufficient to satisfy the enablement requirement for Amgen’s patent claim over all antibodies that bind to PSK9 protein and block PSK9 protein’s ability to bind to LDL receptors. Amgen argues that the focus of the enablement standard should be on whether the disclosure leads people to “make and use” the claimed invention and that common techniques do not amount to undue experimentation. Sanofi counters that the disclosures should be specific for broad patent claims and that Amgen’s trial-and-error techniques amount to undue experimentation. This case has significant implications on future innovation in the pharmaceutical industry and the patent law system.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether enablement is governed by the statutory requirement that the specification teach those skilled in the art to “make and use” the claimed invention, or whether it must instead enable those skilled in the art “to reach the full scope of claimed embodiments” without undue experimentation—i.e., to cumulatively identify and make all or nearly all embodiments of the invention without substantial “time and effort.” 

Heart disease and cholesterol named elevated low-density lipoprotein (“LDL”) are correlated. Amgen Inc. v. Sanofi, Aventisub LLC. at 1082. When cholesterol is in the blood stream, the LDL receptors remove LDL cholesterol. Id. And the degradation of LDL receptor is regulated by an enzyme named proprotein convertase subtilisin/kexin type 9 (“PCSK9”). Id. at 1082–83.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Oskar Liivak for his guidance and insights into this case.

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Jack Daniel’s Properties, Inc. v. VIP Products, LLC

Issues

Does the humorous use of another’s trademark as one’s own on a commercial product receive heightened First Amendment protection, and is such use “noncommercial” and therefore immune from a dilution by tarnishment claim?

Jack Daniel’s Properties, Inc. demanded that VIP Products stop selling a dog toy called “Bad Spaniels,” a toy in the shape of a Jack Daniel’s whiskey bottle but with dog-related alterations to the name and label. The issue is whether the “Bad Spaniels” toy should receive heightened First Amendment protection as a form of expressive conduct or whether courts should analyze such satirical products under the traditional trademark infringement test of the Lanham Act. Additionally, the Supreme Court must consider whether humorous use of another’s trademark should be considered a “noncommercial” use and therefore be immune from a dilution by tarnishment claim. Jack Daniel’s contends that the Ninth Circuit’s endorsement of the Second Circuit’s likelihood-of-confusion test undermines the purpose of the Lanham Act and that “Bad Spaniels” violates the Lanham Act’s anti-dilution provision. VIP Products counters that the Second’s Circuit’s test fills in gaps in the Lanham Act and is widely accepted by lower federal courts; and, it further contends that the Lanham Act’s anti-dilution provision amounts to unconstitutional viewpoint discrimination. The decision in this case will affect the rights of trademark holders, as well as the protections of those whose political, social, and artistic work utilizes the trademarks of others.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether humorous use of another’s trademark as one’s own on a commercial product is subject to the Lanham Act’s traditional likelihood-of-confusion analysis, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1), or instead receives heightened First Amendment protection for trademark-infringement claims; and (2) whether humorous use of another’s mark as one’s own on a commercial product is “noncommercial” and thus bars as a matter of law a claim of dilution by tarnishment under the Trademark Dilution Revision Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1125(c)(3)(C).

VIP Products, LLC (“VIP”) sells dog toys that parody well-known beverage brands on its website, MyDogToy.com. VIP Prods. LLC v. Jack Daniel’s Props. at 1172. These products, called “Silly Squeakers,” are in the shape of beverage bottles and cans but contain dog puns and other alterations.

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Coinbase, Inc. v. Bielski

Issues

Is a district court deprived of jurisdiction to proceed with litigation pending appeal when a non-frivolous appeal is filed in response to a denial of a motion to compel arbitration?  

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether an appeal of an order denying a motion to compel arbitration automatically strips the district court of its jurisdiction to continue the litigation on the merits of the case pending the results of the appeal. The Third, Fourth, Seventh, Tenth, Eleventh and D.C. Circuits have all held that district courts are deprived of jurisdiction in this situation, while the Second, Fifth, and Ninth Circuits have held the opposite. Coinbase, Inc. argues that the “Divestiture Rule” applies here—the district court is divested of jurisdiction pending an appeal of a motion to compel arbitration. Abraham Bielski counters that the traditional discretionary test applies, which grants the district court the discretion to grant or deny a stay of the proceedings until the appeal is resolved. This case touches on important questions regarding judicial economy, economic efficiency, and the treatment of arbitration agreements in relation to other contracts.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a non-frivolous appeal of the denial of a motion to compel arbitration ousts a district court’s jurisdiction to proceed with litigation pending appeal.

Coinbase, Inc. (“Coinbase”) is a cryptocurrency exchange platform, which stores cryptocurrency for account holders in digital wallets. Bielski v. Coinbase, Inc. at 1. Abraham Bielski (“Bielski”) created an account with Coinbase and set up a digital wallet on the platform in 2021. Id. at 2.

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Arizona v. Navajo Nation

Issues

Is there a trust relationship between the Navajo Nation and the U.S. government and no jurisdictional prohibitions such that the Navajo Nation can compel the U.S. Government to assess and manage the Nation’s water interests in the Colorado River?

Note: The authors mirror the parties’ and courts’ use of the term “Indian” as a legal term in this Preview.

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether there is a trust relationship between the Navajo Nation (“the Nation) and the U.S. government regarding the Nation’s water rights. Arizona contends that the Nation’s claim infringes upon the Supreme Court’s retained and exclusive jurisdiction over the allocation of water from the Colorado River mainstream in Arizona v. California. Furthermore, Arizona argues that the Nation has failed to state a cognizable breach-of-trust claim because the Nation did not specify a source of law establishing the government’s fiduciary duty. The Nation counters that the claim does not fall under the Supreme Court’s reserved jurisdiction because the Nation did not seek a quantification of its rights to the Colorado River mainstream. The Nation further contends that it has identified provisions in treaties, statutes, and the Winters doctrine to establish the trust duty on the federal government to ensure an adequate water supply for the Navajo Reservation. The outcome of this case will have far-reaching implications for the Navajo Nation’s water resources, the stability of water rights, and the water allocation system.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether the opinion of the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 9th Circuit, allowing the Navajo Nation to proceed with a claim to enjoin the secretary of the U.S. Department of the Interior to develop a plan to meet the Navajo Nation’s water needs and manage the mainstream of the Colorado River in the Lower Basin so as not to interfere with that plan, infringes upon the Supreme Court’s retained and exclusive jurisdiction over the allocation of water from the LBCR mainstream in Arizona v. California; and (2) whether the Navajo Nation can state a cognizable claim for breach of trust consistent with the Supreme Court’s holding in United States v. Jicarilla Apache Nation based solely on unquantified implied rights to water under the doctrine of Winters v. United States?

The Navajo Nation (“the Nation”) is a federally recognized Indian tribe that signed the 1849 Treaty and the 1868 Treaty with the United States. Navajo Nation v.

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Abitron Austria GmbH v. Hetronic International, Inc.

Issues

Does the Lanham Act apply extraterritorially to trademark infringement by a foreign entity’s conduct outside of the United States, including those foreign commercial activities that never took place in the United States or confused U.S. consumers?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the Lanham Act (“the Act”), a federal trademark law, applies extraterritorially to trademark infringement outside the United States by a foreign entity. Abitron argues that the Act does not apply to foreign sales, because such an extensive reading of the Act’s scope is not supported by statutory interpretation or case law. Hetronic counters that both the Act’s language and the Court’s precedent about Congress and the Act’s expansive power leaves no doubt about its extraterritorial reach. The outcome of this case has heavy implications for the territoriality principle in international law and the rights and remedies of U.S. trademark owners.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the U.S. Court of Appeals for the 10th Circuit erred in applying the Lanham Act, which provides civil remedies for infringement of U.S. trademarks, extraterritorially to Abitron Austria GmbH’s foreign sales, including purely foreign sales that never reached the United States or confused U.S. consumers.

In the 1980s, a German engineer developed radio control products and established a German company, Hetronic Steuersysteme GmbH, which was the predecessor of one of the parties in this case, Abitron Austria GmbH, et al. (“Abitron”). Brief for Petitioners, Abitron Austria GmbH, et al. at 8. The German engineer later established Hetronic International, Inc.

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New York v. New Jersey

Issues

Does the language of the Waterfront Commission Compact, which grants the Waterfront Commission broad policing and regulatory powers, permit New Jersey to unilaterally withdraw from the compact? 

Court below
Original Jurisdiction

This case asks the Court to determine whether New Jersey can unilaterally withdraw from the Waterfront Commission Compact, which it signed with New York in 1953. New York argues that New Jersey cannot withdraw without New York’s agreement because the Compact’s writers intended to bar unilateral withdrawal. New York also argues that unilateral withdrawal would violate New York sovereignty. New Jersey argues that indefinite compacts with continuing duties, like the Waterfront Commission Compact, always allow unilateral withdrawal unless specifically stated otherwise. New Jersey further alleges that requiring mutual withdrawal would prevent New Jersey from reclaiming its sovereign powers. The outcome of this case will impact interstate compacts throughout the nation, state sovereignty, and anti-crime and anti-corruption efforts within the waterfront of New York and New Jersey.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether the Supreme Court should issue declaratory judgment and/or enjoin New Jersey from withdrawing from its Waterfront Commission Compact with New York, which grants the Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor broad regulatory and law-enforcement powers over all operations at the Port of New York and New Jersey.  

In order to address criminal activity and corrupt hiring practices within the Port of New York, former New York Governor Thomas Dewey ordered an investigation of the port in November 1951. Waterfront Commission of New York Harbor v. Murphy at 2. The New York State Crime Commission, in conjunction with the New Jersey Law Enforcement Council, subsequently investigated the port, discovering rampant criminal activity. Id.

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Dubin v. United States

Issues

If a criminal defendant uses someone else’s name while committing a criminal offense, can they also be charged with identity fraud?

This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether a criminal defendant who uses someone else’s name while committing a criminal offense can also be charged with identity fraud. Petitioner David Dubin, an employee at a psychological evaluations services company, used the name of a patient on a form he filled out while committing healthcare fraud. Respondent, the United States, charged him with committing aggravated identity theft under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). The circuits have split over how to interpret 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1), specifically when defendants should be charged with identity fraud while committing an underlying offense. This circuit split has created tension over how broadly or narrowly the statute should be read in light of its language, the surrounding context, and congressional intent. The decision could impact the level of discretion that prosecutors enjoy when prosecuting claims under § 1028 and the extent of due process rights for criminal defendants in such cases.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

Whether a person commits aggravated identity theft any time they mention or otherwise recite someone else’s name while committing a predicate offense.

Petitioner David Dubin worked for Psychological A.R.T.S., P.C. (“PARTS”), a psychological services company that provided mental health testing services to people at emergency shelters in Texas. United States v. Dubin at 321. Williams House, an emergency youth shelter, engaged PARTS to perform testing services. Id. PARTS and Williams House agreed that PARTS would determine whether shelter residents were Medicaid-eligible.

Acknowledgments

The authors would like to thank Professor Stephen P. Garvey for his insights into this case. 

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Department of Education v. Brown

Issues

Do two student-loan borrowers have Article III standing to challenge the Department of Education's Student Loan Debt Relief Plan, and did the Department of Education act consistent with its statutory authority and applicable procedural requirements in adopting the Plan?

This case asks the Supreme Court to clarify whether two student-loan borrowers have Article III standing to challenge the Department of Education’s Student Loan Debt Relief Plan (“Plan”), and whether the Department of Education acted consistent with its statutory authority and applicable procedural requirements in adopting the Plan. The Department of Education argues that Brown lacks Article III standing to challenge the Plan, that the Plan is statutorily authorized under the HEROES Act, and that the Secretary of Education has the authority to waive or modify the relevant procedural requirements. On behalf of herself and a similarly situated individual, Myra Brown counters that she has Article III standing to challenge the Plan, the Department of Education lacks the statutory authority to adopt the Plan, and the Plan is procedurally defective. This case has significant implications for the viability of the Student Loan Debt Relief Plan and the scope of executive power.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether two student-loan borrowers have Article III standing to challenge the Department of Education's student-debt relief plan; and (2) whether the department's plan is statutorily authorized and was adopted in a procedurally proper manner.

On October 12, 2022, the Secretary of Education proposed the Student Loan Debt Relief Plan (“Plan”) under authority granted by the Higher Education Relief Opportunities for Students Act of 2003 (“HEROES Act”). Myra Brown, et al. v. U.S. Department of Education, et al. at 5.

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Biden v. Nebraska

Issues

Can six states challenge the Biden administration’s student debt relief plan by arguing that the plan exceeds the Secretary of Education’s authority or is arbitrary and capricious?

This case asks the Supreme Court to consider the legality of the Biden administration's student debt relief plan, which six states have challenged, claiming that the plan exceeds the Secretary of Education’s authority. The Biden administration argues that the six states do not have standing to bring the lawsuit because they do not suffer injuries caused by the student debt relief plan. Further, the Biden administration contends that even if the six states do have standing, the student debt relief plan falls within the statutory power of the Secretary of Education. The six states counter that they can establish standing because the student debt relief plan could cause financial loss to their state-authorized loan entity or reduce state tax revenue. The six states further contend that the student debt relief plan exceeds the statutory authority of the Secretary of Education because the plan is neither necessary nor proportionate to ameliorate the conditions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. The outcome of this case will have far-reaching implications for student loan borrowers, state budgets, and the overall economy.

Questions as Framed for the Court by the Parties

(1) Whether six states have Article III standing to challenge the Department of Education's student-debt relief plan; and (2) whether the plan exceeds the secretary of education's statutory authority or is arbitrary and capricious.

Title IV of the Higher Education Act of 1965 (“Higher Education Act”) grants the Secretary of Education (“Secretary”) the authority to award federal financial aid to eligible students for their postsecondary education. 20 U.S.C.

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