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This case asks the Supreme Court to interpret Section 2 of the Voting Rights Act (“VRA”), which prohibits discriminatory voting practices. Petitioner Alabama Secretary of State John Merrill claims Alabama’s recently redrawn congressional district map, which results in one majority-minority district, does not violate the VRA because it was drawn using race-neutral guidelines. Respondent Evan Milligan counters that the map violates the VRA because its effect is to concentrate Black voters into one district, undermining their voting power. This case has important ramifications for future redistricting efforts and for claims of vote dilution under the VRA.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to define MoneyGram’s Official Checks (“Official Checks”) to determine which states have jurisdiction over funds from unclaimed Official Checks, and then to clarify which abandoned financial instruments are subject to the Federal Disposition of Abandoned Money Orders and Traveler’s Checks Act (“FDA”). The FDA sets the standards for the remittance of funds payable on unclaimed financial instruments. Petitioner Delaware argues that Official Checks are “third party bank checks,” not “money orders,” “traveler’s checks,” or “other similar written instruments” and are therefore not subject to the FDA. Respondents Pennsylvania and Wisconsin counter that Official Checks are subject to the FDA as either “money orders” or “other similar written instruments.” The outcome of this case has implications for the state receipt of funds from unpaid financial instruments, the role of the Court in interpreting legislation, and the direction of future litigation regarding the recovery of funds.

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38 U.S.C. § 5110(b)(1) allows veterans who apply for disability compensation benefits within one year of discharge from the military to have retroactive disability compensation benefits counted from the date of discharge instead of the date of application for benefits. In this case, the Supreme Court will determine whether equitable tolling, an exemption to statutes of limitations under which plaintiffs who could not discover the basis to bring their lawsuits until after the expiration of the limitations period may bring a claim, applies to this one-year deadline. Although 38 U.S.C. § 5110(b)(1) does not have an explicit statute of limitation, Arellano argues that the statute functionally serves as a statute of limitations and that the Court has held that equitable tolling applies by default to functional statutes of limitations, including those applicable to suits against the government. McDonough counters that § 5110(b)(1) is not a statute of limitations, and that if Congress intended to allow equitable tolling to apply to the statute, it would have explicitly stated so in the law. The Court’s decision in this case will impact veterans’ welfare and the speed and procedure of disability claims administration.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether a public school can prohibit a football coach from praying at midfield after a game ends. Petitioner Joseph A. Kennedy argues that he has a First Amendment right to pray on school grounds as long as he does so in his capacity as a private citizen and not as a coach. Respondent Bremerton School District contends that Kennedy impermissibly engaged in religious expression while in the course of performing his duties as a public-school employee. Therefore, Bremerton School District argues that it is properly within their discretion to prohibit Kennedy’s conduct as government speech. Bremerton School District further asserts that even if Kennedy’s prayer is properly considered private speech, they are compelled to prohibit it as a violation of the Establishment Clause. This case holds implications for the nature of the coach-student relationship, the scope of religious expression on public grounds, and the appropriate balance between free speech and religious pluralism.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the All Writs Act (“Act”), which controls an inmate’s access to attorneys and investigative services, authorizes courts to order state officials to transport prisoners to medical examinations in habeas corpus proceedings. In addition, this case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether prisoners must first demonstrate that the medical evidence is reviewable by the issuing court and material to a claim of habeas corpus relief before they can be granted an evidence-collecting writ under the Act. Tim Shoop, Warden, argues that Raymond Twyford’s writ, which orders Shoop to transport the Twyford to a medical examination, violates the “agreeable to the usages and principles of law” clause as well as the “necessary or appropriate clause” of the Act. Therefore, Shoop contends that Twyford’s writ must be struck down. Twyford counters by arguing that the writ in question satisfies both clauses of the Act. Consequently, Twyford argues that the writ must be affirmed. The outcome of this case will impact the rights of thousands of inmates in habeas corpus proceedings as well as the power of courts adjudicating habeas corpus claims.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether a method-of-execution challenge constitutes a habeas petition or may be brought as a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 petition. Petitioner Michael Nance brought a 42 U.S.C. Section 1983 petition alleging that Georgia’s lethal injection was unconstitutional. Michael Nance argues that method-of-execution claims are Section 1983 claims because they do not end or shorten imprisonment but attack the constitutionality of a given punishment or method of execution. Moreover, even if the claim is properly a habeas petition, Nance contends that it is not successive because method-of-execution claims are not ripe until execution is imminent. Respondent Timothy Ward, Commissioner of the Georgia Department of Corrections, counters that because there are no alternative methods of execution, Ward’s claim effectively bars execution—in other words, it is a habeas petition. Ward adds that Nance’s petition is successive because he already challenged this sentence, and no exceptions apply. This case will impact the timely implementation of justice, and constitutional challenges to state sovereignty and methods of execution.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether the Department of Homeland Security (“DHS”) must continue enforcing the Migrant Protection Protocols (“MPP”). On October 29, 2021, DHS issued a decision terminating MPP, a Trump administration policy where Border Patrol returns certain undocumented aliens arriving at the southern border to Mexico during their immigration proceedings. The Biden Administration (“President Biden”) argues that DHS permissibly rescinded MPP via agency memoranda because the amended Immigration and Nationality Act (“INA”) gives DHS discretion over whether to remove, detain, or parole noncitizens. Texas and Missouri respond that DHS’s rescission of MPP has no legal effect because if DHS lacks capacity to detain undocumented aliens, the INA obligates DHS to remove such persons by continuing to enforce MPP. The outcome of this case has significant implications for undocumented aliens seeking asylum in the United States and immigrant communities within the United States, as well as the role of the executive in determining immigration policy.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to consider the contours of state prosecutorial power in Indian country. This case flows from the Supreme Court’s decision in McGirt v. Oklahoma, which found that a significant portion of eastern Oklahoma was Indian country for criminal law purposes. Oklahoma asserts that, under principles of state sovereignty, it has the authority to prosecute crimes committed by non-Indians against Indians in Indian country within the state’s territorial boundaries. Victor Manuel Castro-Huerta counters that a state can prosecute non-Indians for crimes committed in Indian country only when Congress has authorized the state to do so; in all other situations, the federal government has the exclusive authority to prosecute under the General Crimes Act. This case has significant implications for tribal sovereignty and criminal jurisdictional boundaries between states and Indian tribes.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether Section 1930 of the Bankruptcy Judgeship Act of 2017, which increased filing fees in trustee districts but not in bankruptcy administrator districts, violates the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause. Petitioner Alfred H. Siegel argues that the disparity in fees is non-uniform because it applies to different geographic locations in the United States differently. As a result Siegel, contends that that the fee system is unconstitutional, and asks the Court to grant a full refund of the difference in fees. Respondent John P. Fitzgerald, III, counters that the disparity does not violate the uniformity requirement of the Bankruptcy Clause, impacting trustee districts and administrator districts in a facially neutral way. The outcome of this case has heavy implications for the delegation of congressional power and the structure of bankruptcy courts.  

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This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether the State of Washington’s workers’ compensation law may apply to certain federal contract workers without violating the intergovernmental immunity doctrine, which prevents state and federal governments from interfering with each other’s sovereignty. The United States argues the intergovernmental immunity doctrine applies and mandates that the state workers’ compensation law apply evenhandedly to federal, state, and private actors. Washington counters that the federal government has waived its intergovernmental immunity by statute, and even if it did not, the intergovernmental immunity doctrine does not require completely equal treatment of federal and non-federal actors. The outcome of this case has important implications for consideration of workplace dangers and the costs associated with workers’ compensation. 

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