Issues

This case asks the Supreme Court to decide who qualifies as a consumer under the Video Privacy Protection Act (“VPPA”). Michael Salazar, a subscriber to Paramount Global’s (“Paramount”) sports newsletter, asserts that Paramount disclosed his video‑viewing history to Facebook without his consent. Salazar argues that the VPPA’s reference to “goods or services” covers subscribers to any product a video provider offers, even if their subscription is unrelated to videos. Paramount counters that the statute limits consumer status to people who rent, purchase, or subscribe to audiovisual goods or services. The Court’s decision will clarify which website users may invoke the VPPA when providers disclose their video‑viewing information through online tracking tools. The outcome also has implications for the privacy of online viewing histories, businesses’ use of advertising technology, and their exposure to class‑action liability.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether courts must still defer to the Sentencing Commission’s commentary when interpreting the Federal Sentencing Guidelines, as the Court held in Stinson v. United States. Petitioner Kendrick Beaird argues that the Sentencing Reform Act empowers courts, not the Commission, to interpret the Guidelines. Beaird asserts that the Court’s later decisions in Kisor v. Wilkie and Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo undermined Stinson’s deference to the Commission. Respondent the United States agrees that Kisor’s limits apply to the commentary but maintains that the commentary will often still warrant deference. Court‑appointed amicus curiae Anthony J. Dick goes further, arguing that because Congress expressly authorized the Commission to interpret its own Guidelines, Stinson stands and Kisor’s limits do not apply. This case will have significant ramifications for both the length and consistency of sentences in federal criminal cases.

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This case asks the Court to determine whether federal law precludes Boulder’s state-law claims against Suncor Energy (U.S.A.) Inc., Suncor Energy Sales Inc., and Exxon Mobil Corp. for injuries allegedly caused by interstate and international greenhouse-gas emissions, and whether the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear the case. Suncor argues that the Constitution’s structure, the Clean Air Act, and the federal foreign affairs power preclude state-law claims arising from interstate and international emissions. Boulder argues that the Clean Air Act has displaced federal common law governing interstate pollution, that the Act does not preempt its claims, and that its claims fall within traditional state authority. Suncor argues that the Supreme Court has jurisdiction to hear the case, while Boulder contends that the Supreme Court lacks jurisdiction because the Colorado Supreme Court’s decision is not a final judgment subject to review. This case implicates the division of federal and state authority over climate-related litigation and the allocation of economic costs associated with those harms.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to consider whether the Veterans’ Judicial Review Act (“VJRA”) bars federal district courts from hearing constitutional challenges to statutes that affect veterans’ benefits. Floyd Johnson seeks to challenge the constitutionality of a federal law that caps veterans benefits for incarcerated veterans. Johnson argues that the VJRA’s text does not expressly nor impliedly preclude district court review of constitutional questions. The Government responds that the VJRA expressly requires constitutional claims to proceed through the administrative review process and argues that the implied preclusion factors support this conclusion. The outcome of this case raises important questions about the adequacy of administrative review and the separation of powers.

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This case asks the Court both to determine whether the Air Force’s application to renew a permit to dispose of hazardous waste under the Resource Conservation and Recovery Act (“RCRA”) is a final agency action and whether the National Environmental Policy Act’s (“NEPA”) environmental‑review requirements apply to this application. The Air Force argues that the application was not final agency action and, if it was, RCRA’s specific requirements displace NEPA’s more general ones. Prutehi Guåhan counters that the application reflects the Air Force's final decision, and that the NEPA’s requirements do not yield to RCRA here. This case touches on important questions regarding both the interaction between environmental statutes and the extent to which federal agencies must consider environmental consequences before acting.

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This case asks whether a claim that a fiduciary breached their duty of prudence under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act (“ERISA”) requires identification of a meaningful benchmark against which the court can evaluate the claim to advance past the pleading stage. Anderson, on behalf of a class of Intel plan participants, argues that the meaningful benchmark standard creates an unnecessary hurdle to plead ERISA claims and is incompatible with the federal rules of plausibility pleading. Intel Corporation’s Investment Policy Committee (“Intel”) counters that a claim for the breach of the duty of prudence is dependent on the decision-making process of the fiduciary, so a meaningful benchmark is necessary to allow the court to appropriately evaluate the claim. The outcome will have a significant impact on the volume of ERISA litigation, potentially barring more plaintiffs from seeking relief or heightening protection for fiduciaries from meritless suits.

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