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This case asks the Court to determine whether New Jersey can unilaterally withdraw from the Waterfront Commission Compact, which it signed with New York in 1953. New York argues that New Jersey cannot withdraw without New York’s agreement because the Compact’s writers intended to bar unilateral withdrawal. New York also argues that unilateral withdrawal would violate New York sovereignty. New Jersey argues that indefinite compacts with continuing duties, like the Waterfront Commission Compact, always allow unilateral withdrawal unless specifically stated otherwise. New Jersey further alleges that requiring mutual withdrawal would prevent New Jersey from reclaiming its sovereign powers. The outcome of this case will impact interstate compacts throughout the nation, state sovereignty, and anti-crime and anti-corruption efforts within the waterfront of New York and New Jersey.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether a criminal defendant who uses someone else’s name while committing a criminal offense can also be charged with identity fraud. Petitioner David Dubin, an employee at a psychological evaluations services company, used the name of a patient on a form he filled out while committing healthcare fraud. Respondent, the United States, charged him with committing aggravated identity theft under 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1). The circuits have split over how to interpret 18 U.S.C. § 1028A(a)(1), specifically when defendants should be charged with identity fraud while committing an underlying offense. This circuit split has created tension over how broadly or narrowly the statute should be read in light of its language, the surrounding context, and congressional intent. The decision could impact the level of discretion that prosecutors enjoy when prosecuting claims under § 1028 and the extent of due process rights for criminal defendants in such cases.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to clarify whether two student-loan borrowers have Article III standing to challenge the Department of Education’s Student Loan Debt Relief Plan (“Plan”), and whether the Department of Education acted consistent with its statutory authority and applicable procedural requirements in adopting the Plan. The Department of Education argues that Brown lacks Article III standing to challenge the Plan, that the Plan is statutorily authorized under the HEROES Act, and that the Secretary of Education has the authority to waive or modify the relevant procedural requirements. On behalf of herself and a similarly situated individual, Myra Brown counters that she has Article III standing to challenge the Plan, the Department of Education lacks the statutory authority to adopt the Plan, and the Plan is procedurally defective. This case has significant implications for the viability of the Student Loan Debt Relief Plan and the scope of executive power.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to consider the legality of the Biden administration's student debt relief plan, which six states have challenged, claiming that the plan exceeds the Secretary of Education’s authority. The Biden administration argues that the six states do not have standing to bring the lawsuit because they do not suffer injuries caused by the student debt relief plan. Further, the Biden administration contends that even if the six states do have standing, the student debt relief plan falls within the statutory power of the Secretary of Education. The six states counter that they can establish standing because the student debt relief plan could cause financial loss to their state-authorized loan entity or reduce state tax revenue. The six states further contend that the student debt relief plan exceeds the statutory authority of the Secretary of Education because the plan is neither necessary nor proportionate to ameliorate the conditions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic. The outcome of this case will have far-reaching implications for student loan borrowers, state budgets, and the overall economy.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether social media platforms such as Twitter, Facebook, and Google provide substantial assistance to terrorists by allegedly not taking meaningful action to prevent such terrorists from using their services. This case also asks the Supreme Court to determine whether the same social media platforms can be held liable under the Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act (“JASTA”), even if their services were not used in connection with the specific act of terrorism that caused injury to the plaintiff. Twitter contends that a defendant does not knowingly provide substantial assistance through general awareness that terrorists were among its many users, and that liability cannot stem from such generalized assistance to a terrorist organization. Mehier Taamneh counters that whether Twitter and other defendants know of terrorist use of their services is a question of fact, and, at this stage, the Court need only decide that plaintiff’s factual allegation is plausible. Taamneh also argues that liability exists when a defendant substantially assists international terrorism and that JASTA’s text doesn’t limit liability to action that has a direct connection to the specific attack that injures the plaintiff.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to decide whether online platforms can be held liable for algorithmically recommending third-party content to users. Petitioner Reynaldo Gonzalez argues that Google LLC can be held liable for YouTube’s recommendations of ISIS recruitment videos because YouTube does not qualify for immunity under Section 230 of the Communications Decency Act. Respondent Google LLC argues that since YouTube did not create the ISIS videos at issue, it should be able to claim immunity under Section 230. This case will affect the availability of remedies for victims of harmful online content, internet company accountability, moderation, and online speech.

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The Turkish government owns the majority of a bank called Turkiye Halk Bankasi (“Halkbank”), which a grand jury indicted for multiple counts of fraud in 2019. Halkbank, however, argues that it should be immune from any criminal prosecution by the United States because of the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (“FSIA”). The FSIA explicitly provides immunity from civil actions for foreign governments and their instrumentalities, but the Supreme Court has never stated whether it also applies to criminal prosecutions. If foreign governments are not granted immunity from criminal prosecution under the FSIA, then, as the United States argues, 18 U.S.C. § 3231 explicitly authorizes district courts to hear the case. The Supreme Court’s decision could affect international relations between countries if they fear criminal prosecution by the United States. It could also impact the United States’ ability to protect its national security from foreign government-owned entities that fund terrorists.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether a petitioner must file a motion to reconsider with the Board of Immigrant Appeals to satisfy the exhaustion requirement (8 U.S.C. § 1252(d)(1)) of the Illegal Immigration Reform and Immigrant Responsibility Act of 1996 (IIRIRA) and whether this requirement is jurisdictional or a waivable claims-processing rule. Leon Santos-Zacaria argues that the exhaustion requirement is a claims-processing rule because the statute does not mention jurisdiction, and Congress must clearly state that a procedural requirement is jurisdictional for it to be so. Santos-Zacaria further argues that the exhaustion requirement pertains only to remedies available to the alien as of right, which Santos-Zacaria asserts does not include reconsideration. U.S. Attorney General, Merrick Garland, counters that the exhaustion requirement is jurisdictional because the statute is written with language like that which is used to define the scope of appellate jurisdiction. Garland further asserts that the exhaustion requirement encompasses issue exhaustion, which includes reconsideration, because the applicant must give the agency a chance to correct its own mistakes before resorting to appellate review. The outcome of this case will determine the accessibility of judicial review of asylum application decisions.

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This case asks the Supreme Court to determine whether settlement with a school satisfies the exhaustion requirement under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) so that a student might bring a claim for monetary damages in a district court. Miguel Luna Perez asserts that IDEA’s exhaustion is satisfied by a settlement with a school, not only by a decision on the merits. Perez further argues that requiring individuals to exhaust their claims in lieu of settlement would be futile. Further, Perez asserts that allowing non-IDEA claims to proceed without IDEA exhaustion would not cause individuals to bypass the administrative IDEA process. Sturgis Public Schools and Sturgis Board of Education (“Sturgis”) counter that settlement is insufficient for exhaustion requirements especially when the individual seeks monetary damages. Sturgis further contends that allowing non-IDEA claims to proceed without IDEA exhaustion might result in parents seeking monetary damages in the courts to the detriment of their child’s free appropriate public education. The outcome of this case has important implications on the substantive rights of children with disabilities in terms of the dispute resolution proceedings between the schools and parents. 

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The Supreme Court in this case will determine whether the Federal Labor Relations Authority (“FLRA”) has jurisdiction to regulate state militia labor practices. The Ohio Adjutant General, Ohio Adjutant General’s Department, and the Ohio National Guard contend that the Ohio National Guard is under state control and that Congress has not expressly included state militias in the Federal Service Labor-Management Relations Statute, and thus the state militias are not subject to the FLRA’s jurisdiction. In contrast, the FLRA maintains that the Guard is subject to the FLRA’s jurisdiction because the statute memorialized various federal regulations providing collective bargaining rights to dual status technicians, and the FLRA’s jurisdiction is necessary to such rights. This case has significant implications for federal military power, labor relations for state militias, and the balance of power between state and federal governments.

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